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Abstract: 
 
 The lack of mass casualty domestic attacks in the United States, carried out by 
foreign fighters, since 9/11 should not be taken for a sign of future invulnerability. Major 
Islamic terrorist organizations have previously conducted attacks focused on splashy 
news headlines and high body counts. However, Al-Qaeda‟s original stated goal was to 
bankrupt the West, not kill everyone in it. Is the United States simply impervious to such 
an attack aimed at causing extensive financial or economic damage? Or is the United 
States vulnerable, and ultimately a sitting duck? This paper will argue the latter. 
 By examining the relationships between Islamic terrorist organizations and drug-
trafficking organizations in Central and South America, and investing the use of 
advanced narco-submarines by the latter, the goal is to explore a viable means for 
inserting a group of armed, trained men undetected into the United States. Case studies 
examine the effectiveness of swarm-style terrorist attacks when compared to WMD and 
lone-wolf terror attacks. Further case studies seek to highlight extensive vulnerabilities 
within the U.S. energy and economic infrastructure that, if taken offline via terrorist 
attack, would result in long-lasting and immensely expensive consequences if attacked. 
 Were Al-Qaeda or another terrorist organization to decide that they wanted to hit 
America in the pocket book as opposed to racking up a body count, this paper seeks to 
show that they possess the means, the ability, and the opportunity to do so. 
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Thesis Introduction 
 
 In the aftermath of 9/11, there has not been another mass-casualty attack carried 
out by terrorist foreign fighters in the United States. Widespread changes and 
developments to intelligence collection and sharing, law enforcement and government 
coordination, and safety procedures have prevented another “Black Swan” like 9/11 from 
happening. It is also possible to argue that this lack in attacks is not due to interest or 
effort by Al-Qaeda or ISIS – one need only to look at the numerous attacks that have 
occurred in Western Europe in the last few years to see that Islamic terrorist still possess 
a fundamental desire, and indeed make it a primary goal, to strike at the West. 
 Interestingly, these mass-casualty attacks veer somewhat from the original path 
laid out by Al-Qaeda back in the early 2000s. Osama bin Laden and other senior Al-
Qaeda leaders repeatedly stated that the ultimate goal was to bankrupt the West, and 
cause crippling financial damage which would hamstring the West‟s attempts to combat 
Islamic radicalism. However, the majority of terrorist attacks in recent years appear to 
focus on simply running up a body count, and financial impacts only come about 
indirectly. Why have Islamic terrorists not directly gone after a target which would have 
a direct and significant impact on a Western country‟s economy – is this due to a 
contradiction in dogma, focusing on body counts instead of hitting the enemy in the 
pocketbook? Or is it due to a lack of means or targets that could produce a significant 
financial impact? 
 It is important to investigate this apparent anomaly because the United States risks 
opening itself to another “Black Swan” attack potentially worse than 9/11 if the risk is 
ignored. This thesis aims to highlight how Islamic terrorist organizations, should they 
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wish to conduct a strike against the domestic U.S. that resulted in significant financial 
and economic impacts, possess the means, ability, and targets to conduct such an attack. 
Furthermore, should they do so, there is currently little the U.S. could do to prevent or 
effectively recover quickly from such an attack. 
 In Chapter 1, “SHADOWS IN THE DEEP: Narco-Submarines, Terrorism, and 
Domestic Security”, I examine the nature and history of the relationships between Islamic 
terrorist organizations and drug-trafficking organizations in Central and South America, 
and explore the development and use of advanced narco-submarines by the latter to 
smuggle narcotics into the United States and elsewhere. The goal of this chapter is two-
fold: first, to determine if strong business relationships exist between Islamic terrorists 
and drug-trafficking organizations, to the point that the latter may assist the former in 
achieving objectives inside the U.S.; and secondly, to explore the effectiveness of drug-
running narco-submarines, if the U.S. is effectively interdicting them, and if drug subs 
are capable of smuggling more than just narcotics. My argument for this chapter is that 
the drug-trafficking organizations possess a means of clandestine transport and entry into 
the United States (narco-submarines) that Islamic terrorist organizations are capable of 
exploiting – a vessel capable of carrying ten tons of narcotics can just as easily transport 
armed men and materiel. Furthermore, I seek to highlight that drug-trafficking 
organizations have assisted Islamic terrorist organizations in the past, and thus are 
capable and willing partners in the future. 
 In Chapter 2, “THE STINGING SWARM: the Threat the United States Faces 
from Terrorist and Swarm Tactics”, I examine the effectiveness of swarm-style terrorist 
attacks in comparison to WMD and lone wolf-style terror attacks. The purpose of this 
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chapter is to explore whether a swarm-style terror attack poses a greater threat to the 
domestic United States than a WMD or lone-wolf terror attack, in measuring the effects 
and casualties resulting from examples of each style of attack. I explore a number of case 
studies examining the effectiveness of swarm tactics in both military settings (real-world 
and training environments) as well as two actual terror attacks in which swarm tactics 
were employed (Mumbai in 2008 and Paris in November 2015). As a measurable 
comparison, I then compare the casualty tallies from WMD, lone-wolf, and swarm-based 
terror attacks in order to determine which yields the highest body count. Swarm attacks 
produce significantly more casualties, last longer, require greater law enforcement effort 
to end, and in both cases resulted in cities being, for all intents and purposes, shut down 
for the duration. 
 Lastly, Chapter 3, “SPOILING GOLIATH‟S GARDEN: Determining the 
Vulnerability of U.S. Economic and Energy Infrastructure to Kinetic Attacks”, explores 
centers of gravity within the U.S. economic and energy infrastructure that represent soft 
targets vulnerable to kinetic terrorist attacks. In particular, I chose to look at centers of 
gravity with the electrical and petroleum/economic industries, as these represent some of 
the most crucial enablers of everyday life. Examining these critical nodes through a series 
of case studies, the goal is to highlight their importance and vulnerability, as well as the 
ramifications of a successful terrorist attack on one or several of the examined cases. 
From key elements of the western U.S. electrical grid, to shipping, to the petroleum 
industry, the United States is replete with infrastructure that possess little in the way of 
defense from a determined kinetic attack. Drawing on real-world examples which 
manifested on a much smaller scale, the chapter explores the relative vulnerability of key 
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nodes to simple kinetic attacks, the difficulties faced in compensating for a lost node, and 
the secondary and tertiary economic, environmental, and societal effects of an attack on 
any of the examined case study subjects. 
 
 The overarching goal of this thesis is to lay out a clear blueprint, a “Road to 
Crisis” as to how an overseas Islamic terrorist organization could clandestinely infiltrate 
significant numbers of men and materiel into the United States; showcase tactics that 
maximize the effectiveness of a small number of armed individuals against a larger 
opponent; and pinpoint targets where terrorists could strike in order to cause extensive 
and long-lasting economic and domestic damage to the United States, not through killing 
Americans but through infrastructure and economic damage. Rather than exploring the 
probability, this paper aims to examine the possibility of such an attack on key 
infrastructure. In presenting a cohesive threat arc and providing real-world scenarios that 
illustrate the individual concepts on a smaller scale, the desired outcome of this thesis is 
to foster constructive dialogue and the development of effective counters to the threats 
examined herein. 
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Chapter 1: Shadows in the Deep 
Terrorism, Narco-submarines, and Domestic Security 
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Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will address the following question: 
Considering the developing relationships between international terrorist organizations 
seeking to attack U.S. interests and drug cartels in Central and South America, do narco-
submarines pose a significant threat to U.S. domestic security? 
 
 Narco-submarines, also known as narco-subs and drug subs, are fully submersible 
naval craft operated by drug cartels in Central and South America. Used to transport 
narcotics in great quantities, in recent years they have proven to be a stealthy and 
effective means of penetrating U.S. coastal security measures. Utilized by the cartels in 
the Pacific Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and Atlantic Ocean, in recent years their numbers 
have increased dramatically. 
I would argue that narco-submarines do pose a distinct threat to the U.S. 
homeland, and I plan to do so in this paper using a two-step approach. First, I will explore 
current relationships between international terrorist organizations that may have an 
interest in conducting an attack on U.S. soil, and drug cartels operating narco-submarines 
to transport narcotics from Central and South America into the United States. Once the 
scope of this relationship is established, the second (and majority) section of the chapter 
will explore and assess the history, evolution, and capabilities of drug cartel narco-
submarines.  
 My goal in this chapter is to show that, while not a concern to U.S. domestic 
security when operated by drug cartels, narco-submarines do pose a significant threat if 
acquired by a terrorist organization seeking to attack the United States at home. 
Furthermore, my intent with this paper is to not only shed light on this little-known 
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subject, but to spark further dialogue and research geared towards implementing a better 
defensive strategy for U.S. shores. 
 
Literature Review 
There is a dearth of academic literature specifically examining the domestic 
security threat posed by narco-submarines; even the U.S. government realized this and 
commissioned a study to be done in an attempt to develop a capabilities analysis and 
threat assessment of narco-submarines, which are deemed to be an 
“underconsidered/understudied topic”
1
.  
While unarmed, narco-subs possess the capability to transport tons of men and 
materiel just as easily as they transport narcotics. Initially crude, small and only semi-
submersible, narco-subs are now large, fully-submersible, stealthy craft capable of 
accurate navigation and transporting tons of cargo for thousands of miles
2
. Current 
interdiction operations only succeed in catching roughly one of every four detected 
narco-subs
3
. Such an effective means of penetrating the U.S. border security apparatus 
represents a major threat to U.S. domestic security, particularly when considering the 
possibilities of a terrorist organization acquiring the use of a narco-sub and utilizing it to 
transport operatives and equipment (including “dirty bombs”, biological agents, high 
explosives, and other weapons) to the United States undetected. 
 
                                                          
1
 Edited by Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker, “Narco-Submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels Used For 
Drug Smuggling Purposes”, written for the Foreign Military Studies Office, 2014. PDF.  
2
 Byron Ramirez, “Narco-Submarines: Applying Advanced Technologies to Drug Smuggling”, Small Wars 
Journal. Posted 8 March 2014. Accessed 25 February 2016.  
3
 Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker, “Narco-Submarines: Drug Cartels’ Innovative Technology”, Center 
for International Maritime Security, 2 August 2014.  
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Discussion on Parallel Literatures 
 There are several literatures that run parallel to my arguments. These include: 
 drug cartel capabilities and intentions 
 counter-narcotics and drug-interdiction operations 
 the existence and scope of ties between drug cartels and international terrorist 
organizations 
 
Examining the cartels‟ capabilities and intentions will ideally provide me with both 
historical background and technical/performance details of the cartels as well as their 
narco-subs. With their primary purpose being the covert transport of illicit narcotics, 
narco-subs are a major target for attempts by U.S. agencies intent on stemming the flow 
of drugs into the United States. Literature examining current and potential business ties 
between cartel and terrorist groups will provide crucial support for my main argument.  
 
Schools of Thought 
 Literature regarding drug cartel capabilities seems to agree on a number of points: 
narco-subs are becoming more sophisticated and capable; cartels are using them with 
dramatically-increasing frequency
4
; and they are almost impossible to locate and capture 
once launched. Most of the focus in this literature is on the transport of narcotics, 
however; little thought seems to be given towards other potential cargo (i.e. terrorists and 
weapons). Only two
5
 sources
6
 directly address the possibility of terrorists utilizing narco-
subs for transporting something besides narcotics, and a third source
7
 mentions the 
                                                          
4
 “Waving, Not Drowning”. The Economist, 1 May 2008.  
5
 Terrance G. Lichtenwald, Mara H. Steinhour, and Frank S. Perri, ibid 
6
 Joseph Direnzo,  “What the Semi-submersibles Mean: Transnational Gangs, Drugs, and Terrorism”, 
Defense Media Network, 12 August 2010.  
7
 Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker, “Narco-Submarines: Drug Cartels’ Innovative Technology”, ibid 
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possibility in one brief paragraph. I intend to explore this concept in fuller detail and 
address this gap in the current field of analysis. 
 Regarding counter-narcotics and drug-interdiction operations, there is a consensus 
that the most effective tactic to counter drug-subs is to capture them while still being 
assembled in their tropical workshops. In agreement with literature assessing drug cartel 
capabilities, parallel literature concerning drug interdiction operations emphasizes the 
difficulty of detecting drug subs once they have launched, although new technology and 
tactics are starting to bear fruit as well
8
. However, there is little discussion into how 
looming budget cuts will affect the effectiveness of current interdiction efforts. Nor is 
there any discussion on interdicting drug subs when they stop to offload cargo. This may 
be due to security concerns; nonetheless, any information will prove useful as I describe 
current efforts to interdict narco-subs, and why those efforts must be increased. 
 Literature on connections between drug cartels and terrorist organizations 
emphasizes a growing connection between drug cartels in Central and South America
9
 
and terrorist organizations hostile to the United States, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, 
Hamas and Hezbollah. The majority of the focus seems to be on terrorist organizations 
using drug trafficking as a means of income to fund other operations
10
. However, the 
sources also indicate that there is growing concern about potential cooperation between 
the two groups to smuggle terrorist operatives and accompanying weaponry into the 
United States
11
. This parallel literature will prove most efficacious to my thesis by 
                                                          
8
 Christopher Lagan, “Drug Subs 2.0”, Coast Guard Compass, 13 July 2010 
9
 Testimony by Steven C. McCraw, ADOIC-FBI before the Senate Judiciary Committee on 20 May 2003 
10
 Michael Braun, “Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing Nexus?”, The 
Washington Institute, 25 July 2008 
11
 Michael T. McCaul, “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest 
Border”, Congressional Report before Congress, November 2012, p. 3-5. 
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providing proof of cooperation between drug cartels and terrorist organizations, and 
thereby validating the possibility of terrorists acquiring the use of a narco-sub. 
 
Theory and Hypothesis 
Narco-submarines are a newer technology, initially appearing the mid-90‟s and 
seeing a rapid increase in technology, sophistication, and usage. They have progressed 
from small, semi-submersible, short-range craft to vessels capable of transporting four 
tons of cargo from Ecuador and Honduras to Europe running entirely underwater
12
, 
powered and operated by advanced technology despite being constructed in covert jungle 
workshops. Furthermore, U.S. operations have thus far proven very unsuccessful at 
interdicting these craft, even when their general routes and schedules are known
13
. 
 I am in somewhat uncharted waters in exploring this subject: scant work has been 
done on this topic, and therefore there are few official theories to support or debunk. At 
best, scholars and researchers have made tentative statements
14
 regarding the possibility 
of terrorist groups acquiring and using a narco-sub. The overwhelming majority of work 
concerning narco-submarines is focused on their drug-smuggling capabilities, even those 
also examining the applications of narco-sub technology
15
 by terrorist groups. In the 
absence of more-formalized and institutionalized theories, I am left with my own: narco-
submarines pose a significant threat to U.S. domestic security if one or more find their 
way into the hands of terrorist organizations. 
                                                          
12
 Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker, “Narco-Submarines: Drug Cartels’ Innovative Technology”, Center 
for International Maritime Security, 2 August 2014. 
13
 “Waving, Not Drowning”. ibid. 
14
 Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker, “Narco-Submarines: Drug Cartels’ Innovative Technology”, ibid 
15
 Terrance G. Lichtenwald, Mara H. Steinhour, and Frank S. Perri, ibid 
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Regarding the plausibility of terrorist groups acquiring a narco-sub, again there is 
no official theory around which to frame my argument. However, what is known is the 
extensive and still-developing
16
 relationships
17
 between terrorist groups and drug 
cartels
18
. Aiding and abetting one another in the transport and trade of narcotics, 
weapons, and terrorist individuals
19
, my argument is that there exists a firm-enough line 
of communication and commerce that, should they so desire, terrorist organizations 
would be able to purchase passage or use of a narco-sub operated by a drug cartel in 
Central or South America. 
 
Methodology 
There are three concepts which underlie assumptions about the collection of 
relevant information during my research: 
 
 Data vs. Information: 
- If “data” primarily implies numbers, then many elements of Global Security 
Studies, including my hypothesis, do not utilize data in the Statistics sense. 
- My hypothesis cannot be supported by “data”, as very little of it exists. It may 
exist in certain Top Secret echelons, although if I had access to it I would still 
be unable to use it due to its sensitive nature. 
                                                          
16
 Michael Braun, ibid 
17
 Testimony by Steven C. McCraw, ibid 
18
 Michael T. McCaul, ibid 
19
 McCaul, p. 5 
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- My hypothesis utilizes what information is available, making use of the 
broader category of “information”, which consists of estimates, observations, 
and trends reported by observers 
Risk vs. Uncertainty: 
- Information is used to determine risk, a numerically measurable concept as 
defined by the discipline of Statistics. It is useful for the “Law of Large 
Numbers”, but not useful in predicting “The Next Event”, which is the focus 
of my hypothesis. 
Uncertainty: 
- Uncertainty can be said to be an unquantifiable ignorance, defined by 
logical, psychological, or event-driven information or the lack thereof
20
. 
Uncertainty is what underlies my hypothesis. The information I will be using 
involves estimates reported by people giving their opinions, who themselves 
may have reasons to either de-emphasize or exaggerate their estimate. 
 
To summarize: information is utilized to assess risk, which through the 
application of analytics produces conclusions/probabilities to indicate outcomes
21
. 
Information is also used to establish uncertainty; this uncertainty informs behavioral 
events, trends, and possibilities to indicate outcomes (the topic of this paper). 
 
Research Method 
My primary method in conducting the research for this chapter is the Sequential 
Exploratory Method (SEM). SEM consists of two stages: qualitative information 
                                                          
20
 www.businessdictionary.com/dictionary/uncertainty.html 
21
 www.businessdictionary.com/dictionary/risk.html 
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collection and analysis, followed by quantitative information analysis that compliments 
or provides additional detail on the results of the first phase
22
.The first phase is generally 
given the majority of emphasis and development, with data from the second phase 
serving to highlight and compliment key informative points from the first. This method 
will help answer my research question by giving me a simple, yet concrete, framework 
within which to conduct my research and frame an answer to my research question, while 
allowing for the presentation of both qualitative and quantitative information. 
 This method is excellent for answering my research question as “the primary 
focus of this model is to initially explore a phenomenon”
23
. It is also touted for being 
useful in “testing elements of an emergent theory”
24
. Since this body of work can be said 
to be exploring two different phenomena, and proposing an “emergent theory”, this 
method seems well-suited for the type of research and goals that I have in mind. 
 Also, SEM is ideal due to its design. It is simple, linear, and uncomplicated: two 
phases of research, the second (quantitative) done with the goal of complimenting the 
results synthesized from the first (qualitative). Unlikely to confuse either the researcher 
or the researcher‟s audience, this method is ideal for answering a research question that 
seeks to explore and expand upon current qualitative information
25
. 
 The dual focus of this method allows for a wide variety of data sources. For the 
first qualitative phase, I expect to draw from academic and strategic journal articles, 
newspaper and magazine articles, and military/government assessments. SEM will 
facilitate the collection of information regarding the nature of terrorist/drug cartel 
                                                          
22
 John W. Creswell, “Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches”, Sage 
Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks, CA, 2009, p. 211 
23
 Creswell, p. 211 
24
 Ibid., p. 211 
25
 Creswell, p. 212 
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relations, the history and capabilities of narco-submarines, and interdiction methods past, 
present, and future. This is particularly important since the theoretical nature of my 
research question places the emphasis on qualitative information, and not necessarily 
quantitative data. 
 For the quantitative segments, I will look for sources focusing on technical, 
measurable data: government reports detailing success rates of interdiction efforts and 
technological advancements in narco-sub design, the numbers of narco-subs captured or 
lost, or the frequency and magnitude of interactions between terrorist organizations and 
drug cartels. If information from the first phase does not correspond to data collected 
from the other phase, or if the quantitative data does not confirm and build upon the 
information collected in the qualitative phase, then this will make an argument against 
my question. However, if information and data from both phases of SEM correlate with 
and support one another, then this will bolster the strength and validity of my research 
question. 
 The primary weakness of this method is the quality of the first phase - qualitative 
data collection and analysis. Incomplete or vague data collection here will compromise 
the subsequent quantitative research and analysis. Utilizing this method, I must collect 
information from as many qualitative sources (in terms of design, objective, and 
background) as possible, and seek out the common themes that run through them. I must 
also take care not to rely overly on the qualitative phase of my research. While the 
quantitative data is secondary in this method, it is no less important, and thus I must make 
a conscious effort to give sufficient attention to the research, analysis, and 
implementation of data derived from this phase. 
15 
 
Information 
Terrorist and drug cartel relationships linked 
 The widely-held beliefs amongst key U.S. law enforcement agencies is that 
terrorism and drug trafficking are “inextricably linked”
26
. Long viewed as a key source of 
income, successful drug trafficking by terrorist groups is exemplified in Afghanistan‟s 
provision of the majority of the world‟s heroin under Taliban rule
27
. This is not a 
decreasing trend, either, and it is estimated that up to sixty percent of terrorist 
organizations are involved in drug trafficking
28
. 
 
Intensifying relationships 
 This growth has resulted in an increased presence of international terrorist groups 
in Central and South America. Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as Iranian forces, have been 
found cooperating with members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia 
(FARC), and with drug traffickers in the tri-border area of Brazil, Argentina, and 
Paraguay
29
 
30
 
31
 
32
. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, responsible for approximately 70% of the 
world‟s heroin
33
, also have a proven presence in Central and South America
34
. Above all 
other drug-trafficking groups in Central and South America, the Mexican cartels have 
grown exceedingly powerful, and developed extensive international business 
                                                          
26
 Testimony by Steven C. McCraw, ibid. 
27
 McCraw, ibid. 
28
 Braun, ibid. 
29
 Braun, ibid. 
30
 Rand Beers and Francis X. Taylor, “Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection Between Drugs and 
Terror”, testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, 
Terrorism and Government Information, 13 March 2002 
31
 McCraw, ibid 
32
 McCaul, p. 7-13 
33
 Beers and Taylor, ibid. 
34
 McCaul, p. 11-12 
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relationships in transporting narcotics
35
, including ties with Middle Eastern terrorist 
organizations.  
The burgeoning relationships between terrorist groups and drug cartels have 
expanded beyond simple drug trafficking. Cartels and other drug trafficking 
organizations in Central and South America have facilitated the illegal entry
36
 into the 
United States of suspected terrorists on several occasions
37
, and known or suspected 
terrorists have been captured on numerous occasions attempting to cross the border into 
the U.S. illegally with cartel assistance
38
. On another occasion in 2011, an Iranian 
operative attempted to hire a Mexican cartel hit-man to assassinate the Saudi Arabian 
ambassador to the United States
39
. Representatives of Hezbollah have been captured 
attempting to orchestrate large-scale arms sales to FARC members in return for 
narcotics
40
. 
Current findings from U.S. federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI, 
DEA, and CIA show that these business relationships are far from waning, or staying in 
the current configuration of narcotics and arms exchanges  – rather, this trend is “growing 
at light speed”
41
. 
 
 
 
                                                          
35
 McCaul, p. 15-17 
36
 “Mexican Cartels Smuggle Terrorists into U.S. Through Rural Texas Border Region”, Judical Watch, 29 
July 2015. Accessed 22 October 2016. 
37
 McCaul, p. 5-6 
38
 Border Surge Report, Texas Department of Public Safety, 24 February 2015. Accessed 31 October 2016. 
39
 CNN Wire Staff, “Iranian Plot to Kill Saudi Ambassador Thwarted, U.S. Officials Say,” CNN, Oct. 12 2011. 
Accessed August 12, 2015 
40
 McCaul, p. 10 
41
 Braun, ibid. 
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Narco-submarines: history, development, abilities 
The use of submarines to transport drugs was first explored by the Medellin 
Cartel in Columbia
42
, in response to the rising interception of “go-fast” speed boats by 
naval and coast-guard forces. In an attempt to continue transporting narcotics and reduce 
the number of interceptions by law enforcement, Columbian drug cartels poured 
significant resources into the development of viable transport submarines. They brought 
in Russian naval engineers
43
 to consult on design and technical issues.  
 Initial narco-submarines were assembled in secluded swamps and tributaries, 
away from prying eyes and requiring all materials to be transported in by boat and by 
hand. The “subs” were actually semi-submersibles: small, with a limited range and 
capable of only partial submersion. Other models were capable of diving to shallow 
depths, but were still easily detectable via sonar and Magnetic Anomaly Detection 
(MAD). Yet others were “torpedoes” designed to be towed along underwater by other 
boats. These various designs met with limited success, as they were still vulnerable to 
interception and were incapable of carrying significant amounts of cargo. In addition, 
they proved to be extremely unreliable. However, narco-submarines have progressed 
through a dizzying array of designs and sophistication; from 2000-2007 submarine 
designs went through a relatively rapid “experimentation”, “prototyping”, and 
“standardization and design maturation” phases
44
.  
                                                          
42
 Byron Ramirez, “Narco-Submarines: Applying Advanced Technologies to Drug Smuggling,” Small Wars 
Journal, March 8, 2014. Accessed August 12, 2015 
43
 ibid 
44
 Byron Ramirez and Robert J. Bunker, “Narco-Submarines: Specially Fabricated Vessels Used for Drug 
Smuggling Purposes,” for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), May 2014: 30. Accessed August 12, 
2015 
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In 2010 a submarine was discovered in a Columbian coastal swamp that 
represented what many consider the pinnacle of narco-sub engineering. It was 74-feet 
long, with a hull of carbon fiber and Kevlar to avoid detection. The submarine was 
powered by both diesel and electric sources, with a range of 6800 nautical miles and a 
crew of four to six. It was able to run underwater for eighteen hours on electric power 
before needing to recharge its 289 lead-acid batteries, and the sub was capable of 
carrying nine tons of cocaine or other contraband
45
. Virtually silent when operating on 
electric motors and difficult to detect due to its hull materials, this sub represented a 
monumental leap forward for the cartels, especially since it was equipped with GPS, 
electro-optical periscope, an infrared camera, and other technical equipment to aid in 
navigation and operation. A similar sub was captured several months later, which 
confirmed that this leap in technology was not a one-off occurrence
46
. Bunker and 
Ramirez are quick to point out in their paper that “drug cartels today are much more 
organized, adaptive, and strategic”
47
, and in a business where the profits reach into the 
billions, narco-submarines are seeing a significant amount of money, thought, and effort 
being put into their design and construction. 
 
Current Interdiction Efforts 
 Attempts by U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and Customs to interdict the narco-subs 
have met with limited success. General John F. Kelly, USMC, the commanding general 
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of SOUTHCOM, testified that “last year, we had to cancel more than 200 very effective 
engagement activities”, and due to a shrinking budget SOUTHCOM is unable to pursue 
74 percent of suspected maritime drug trafficking
48
.  When one considers that the 74-
percent statistic is only involving “suspected” trafficking (i.e. observed trafficking) not 
being interdicted and does not factor in the unobserved trafficking that is taking place, it 
is safe to say that SOUTHCOM is missing far more than 74 percent of maritime drug 
trafficking operations. 
The U.S. Coast Guard is struggling as well: despite capturing 129 tons of 
narcotics in 2011, they suspect they have missed another 500 tons, and Rear Adm. 
Charles D. Michel told the New York Times that “[his] staff watches multi-ton loads go 
by”
49
. 129 tons captured out of a suspected 629 tons – this comes out to an interdiction 
rate of 1 sub interdicted for every 6 that go by. Far lower than SOUTHCOM‟s purported 
1 out of 4, and perhaps a more accurate overall reflection of the interdiction rate. There 
are no indicators that any part of this equation will change in the near future, with 
operating budgets for SOUTHCOM and the Coast Guard are being reduced and the 
cartels dumping more and more money, time, and effort into narco-sub R&D.  
 
Strengths and weaknesses 
 The information presented in this paper on terrorist/cartel relationships and narco-
submarines comes from a wide array of sources, including academic and strategic journal 
articles, official government testimonies, newspaper and magazine articles, and 
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government-commissioned studies. The sheer diversity of these sources is a major 
strength – exploring a concept and developing a theory from multiple perspectives allows 
for the creation of a thorough, well-rounded argument. While the less-academic nature of 
the newspaper and magazine sources is a weakness, the validity of the other sources 
allows for thorough fact-checking and validation.  
 
Analysis 
 Considering the information collected on terrorist organizations, drug cartels, and 
narco-submarines, there are a number of conclusions I feel can be drawn from the results 
of the research presented. 
 As previously discussed in the Information section, research shows that there are 
relationships and channels of communication between international terrorist 
organizations (particularly those of Middle Eastern origin who seek to harm the United 
States and her interests) and drug cartels and traffickers operating in Central and South 
America. Furthermore, these relationships have developed well beyond simple 
transactions and transportation of narcotics and money. Exchanges of arms, military 
advice and training, and smuggling of individuals into the U.S. via the border have 
already occurred.  
As these relationships develop and mature, as many U.S. law enforcement 
agencies agree, it is safe to assume as with the past growth of the occurrence of the 
method (submarines) the madness (these types of more dangerous transactions) will only 
increase in scale and occurrence. Considering the majority ownership of the world‟s 
supply of heroin by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the military acumen and hardware 
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possessed by Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iranian operatives, and the desire of Central and 
South American drug cartels to expand their respective spheres of influence and power 
within those spheres, coupled with the fact that the first group wants to attack U.S. 
interests at home and abroad and the latter group possesses the ability, via narco-sub, to 
infiltrate with great rates of success U.S. coastal protective measures, I would argue the 
risk is high that groundwork has been laid for an international terrorist organization to 
acquire passage on, or control of, a narco-submarine. 
Regarding narco-subs, there are a number of conclusions that can be drawn 
which, in turn, address this paper‟s research question. First, as covered in the Information 
section illustrates, narco-submarines have experienced dramatic improvements in design, 
effectiveness, and capability in a relatively short amount of time. Initially only semi-
submersible, or unmanned and towed submerged behind a larger craft, at present narco-
submarines are witnessing tremendous growth in both design and numbers. Now capable 
of running fully-submerged over vast distances, able to transport cargo in quantities up to 
10 tons, and guided by sophisticated re-purposed GPS and sonar equipment, narco-subs 
are capable of traversing great distances with excellent accuracy – gone are the days of 
pilots having to hug the shore or surface repeatedly to check their bearings. Furthermore, 
cartels are designing and coating narco-subs with materials to aid in reducing their 
signatures on both sonar and MAD (Magnetic Anomaly Detection), stealth improvements 
which make them even more difficult to detect. The subs are also cheap for the cartels to 
produce, costing only a couple million dollars each – cheap enough that the cartel crews 
often scuttle them at the end of their journeys, instead of attempting to return them. The 
shrinking price tag also means that smaller cartels and less formal operations will be able 
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to construct and operate their own drug subs. This will result in more drug subs in the 
water, and complicate interdiction efforts. 
Second, findings in the Information section show that these technological 
advancements have resulted in U.S. interdiction efforts facing severe hurdles to curtail 
narco-sub traffic. Effectively invisible once launched, U.S. Navy, Coast Guard, and 
Customs forces are hard-pressed to detect and interdict these vessels. Attempts to capture 
these vessels before launch have shown some success, but not enough to stem the tide of 
narco-subs, approximately 75% of which are estimated to be slipping through U.S. 
coastal defensive measures. This is compounded by the fact that recent budget cuts and 
sequestration will negatively impact U.S. interdiction efforts, and the likelihood of a 
narco-sub being captured in transit will likely approach the old figures of just one in ten 
being caught. A decrease in narco-sub interdiction rates has potentially grave 
implications, in that such an astounding success rate will likely encourage cartels to 
continue to increase the number of narco-submarines being built and used. The increased 
number of drug subs will, in turn, feed a vicious cycle of increasing the stress on 
whatever interdiction forces are present, which means fewer narco-subs will be 
interdicted, which will lead to more being built – rinse, wash, repeat. 
Third, considering the advances made by the cartels in narco-sub construction and 
operation, and the difficulties faced by U.S. forces in stopping them, it would be hard to 
find a more effective means of transporting cargo (including terrorists and their weapons) 
into the United States illicitly. Much effort has been put into making our land borders 
impermeable – those with terrorist connections will find themselves hard-pressed to make 
it through airport customs unmolested, and even crossing on foot across the U.S.-Mexico 
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border is not as easy as it once was. However, as shown in the Information section, a 
narco-sub is just as capable of carrying ten tons of terrorist operatives and their 
equipment (including small arms and explosives) as it is cocaine or marijuana, and at 
worst sees only a 25% chance of being interdicted before reaching U.S. coastal waters 
and offloading its cargo. The cheap cost of narco-subs and their increasing numbers 
would also allow a terrorist group to spread operatives and equipment out across several 
vessels; to do so would almost guarantee a majority, if not all, of a terrorist force reaching 
U.S. shores undetected. Should a terrorist group seek to infiltrate operatives and 
equipment into the United States, they will likely be drawn to the low-risk factors of 
discovery of purchasing passage on, or ownership of, a narco-submarine. 
Counterfactuals 
 For all practical purposes, counterfactuals do not exist for this topic. There is no 
noteworthy argument that the likelihood of terrorist infiltration into the United States 
does not exist, that narco-submarines do not pose a distinct threat, or that the 
sophistication of the smugglers and their submarine capability is not increasing. One 
could argue that a counterfactual can be inferred by the lack of action taken by the 
government and law enforcement agencies; likewise the reduced monetary and personnel 
resources allotted for interdiction efforts. Another counterfactual might be the relative 
lack of energy spent on researching and assessing the threat posed by narco-submarines. 
These are, at best, indirect counterfactuals and do little to directly address my hypothesis. 
Failure to appreciate the severity of a threat does not diminish the likelihood or 
magnitude of that threat. Furthermore, the human tendency to ignore threats until 
negative outcomes have already occurred is a well-known short-coming of the species. 
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 One of the consequences of developing what may be considered an emergent 
theory is that, in addition to finding scant source material, one cannot address the 
counter-arguments made by those who came before, and therefore must wait and allow 
one‟s own theory to be assessed and critiqued. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to determine an answer to the following question: 
Considering the developing relationships between international terrorist organizations 
seeking to attack U.S. interests and drug cartels in Central and South America, do narco-
submarines pose a significant threat to U.S. domestic security? 
 
As of the time of writing, there are no known attempts of a terrorist organization 
attempting to purchase transit on or ownership of a narco-sub. However, the past is not a 
predictor of the future. The purpose of this chapter is to determine not whether event has 
occurred, but the likelihood of an event occurring, and to assess the severity of the threat 
posed by narco-submarines to U.S. domestic security.  
Taking into account the robust and still-developing relationships between terrorist 
organizations such as Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah (and through them 
Iran), and confronting the astounding success that narco-submarines see in transiting 
undetected into U.S. waters, I would argue that narco-submarines pose a distinct, serious 
threat to U.S national security. While themselves unarmed, their ability to transfer large 
amounts of men and materiel illicitly into the United States makes these drug subs a 
significant security threat that bares further investigation and effort to interdict. The 
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narco-subs only need to be right once in order to successfully infiltrate the United States 
– every sub missed has the potential to cause severe and long-lasting damage when one 
considers a cargo of armed terrorists instead of cocaine. 
According to the National Ocean Service, the U.S. coastline extends over 95,471 
miles
50
. Considering that narco-subs are known to be operating in both the Pacific and 
Atlantic Oceans, as well as the Gulf of Mexico, the overwhelming majority of that 
coastline falls within the operating range of those narco-submarines. So what can be done 
to try and mitigate this threat? 
 
Threat mitigation 
Firstly, more research must be done. Narco-submarines have received precious-
little attention academically or militarily; several of the sources used in this chapter came 
from one or both of the same two authors, Byron Ramirez and Robert Bunker. To 
paraphrase Sun Tzu: “if you know yourself, and you know your enemy, you will never 
suffer a defeat”. Sun Tzu would be disappointed in current U.S. efforts to understand and 
learn about narco-submarines. In regards to narco-subs specifically, we currently know 
much about ourselves and very little about the enemy. A clear indicator of this lack of 
intelligence is the fact that only rough estimates on the number of subs making the 
passage into U.S. waters are available, and that no sort of firm count has been attempted. 
Likewise, a better understanding of the nature and scope of relationships between 
terrorist organizations and cartels is required; absent this, effective means of countering 
this working relationship will be difficult to design and implement. In order to effectively 
combat this threat, better intelligence and greater research is needed. Only once a clearer 
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picture is established, and better intelligence collected, can effective steps be taken to 
counter the threat posed by drug subs and their acquisition by terrorist groups. 
Secondly, efforts must be intensified where interdiction efforts have proven 
effective; in particular, attempting to interdict the subs prior to launch. U.S. forces 
operating in conjunction with local law enforcement have seen success in locating and 
raiding fabrication sites in Central and South America – further manpower and funding 
should be steered towards facilitating and increasing the scope of these operations. In 
order to dissuade the cartels from building and operating narco-submarines, U.S. and 
local law enforcement agencies must make narco-subs either cost- or risk-inefficient. 
While making the building process too costly and interdicting the majority of subs at sea 
are proving difficult strategies to implement, what can be done is to make the 
construction process too difficult to undertake. If the cartels see more and more 
construction sites being raided before the subs are completed, and more subs are seized 
than are launched, then the cartels will be pressured to seek out a new method of 
smuggling narcotics. If the cartels are less-inclined to build narco-subs, this in turn will 
lessen the likelihood of one being acquired by a terrorist organization seeking a means to 
infiltrating the United States undetected. All of this can be achieved by increasing the 
scale and scope of land-based interdiction operations. Furthermore, this might prove to be 
more cost-efficient than operating at-sea interdiction elements, which in today‟s era of 
sequestration and diminishing budgets cannot be overlooked. 
Finally, it is necessary to implement a plan closer to home in order to interdict 
subs that do manage to launch. Particularly in the region of Southern Command 
(SOUTHCOM), U.S. Navy and Coast Guard operations have produced results, albeit 
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modest ones
51
. Despite budget cuts across government agencies, curtailing these 
operations only harms interdiction efforts. At best, a cheaper alternative must be sought if 
current successful tactics cannot be bolstered. If constantly patrolling vessels and aircraft 
are too expensive to maintain, perhaps implementing some sort of passive listening array 
in key areas to serve as an early-warning tripwire could prove effective. During the Cold 
War, the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) positioned to cover the Greenland-
Iceland-United Kingdom (GUIK) gap proved effective at detecting Soviet submarines, 
particularly when paired with toward sonar systems
52
. These passive measures could 
decrease operating costs, while ensuring that approaching narco-subs were still detected 
in time for U.S. Navy or Coast Guard forces to interdict them.  
Another option lies in the technology of surface and underwater drones that the 
U.S. Navy is developing. Far smaller and cheaper to operate than a Coast Guard cutter or 
Navy destroyer, as this technology is developed and put into service, perhaps an 
application can be developed to use these drones in counter-sub operations in the Gulf of 
Mexico and other potential narco-sub transit areas. In conjunction with a SOSUS-like 
system, this networked system could provide the Coast Guard, Border Patrol, and U.S. 
Navy with accurate detection and targeting capabilities, and would subsequently improve 
interdiction rates. 
Ultimately, a solution to the threat posed by narco-submarines is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. My purpose in writing is to highlight the threat posed by these 
vessels, and the definitive potential for terrorist groups to access and utilize one of these 
craft to assist in conducting a terrorist attack on the United States. Ideally, wiser and 
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more powerful heads than mine will agree, and seek a means of effectively countering 
this threat. 
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Chapter 2: The Stinging Swarm 
The Threat the United States Faces from Terrorists and Swarm Tactics 
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Introduction 
 
“Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee!”
53
 
 
 
 Widely known amongst boxing and sports fans, Muhammed Ali‟s titular quote 
has applications outside the boxing ring. For example, such tactics were used by Afghan 
and Chechen fighters against the Soviets and Russians in the 1980s and 1990s, insurgents 
from Afghanistan and Iraq against the United States in the last two decades, and 
numerous terrorist attacks during the same period. In order to survive against a more 
numerous, better-armed foe, a fighter must remain light and agile, striking quickly and 
withdrawing before a punishing retaliatory blow can land. 
 Since the attacks on 9/11, the United States has made concentrated efforts to 
protect itself against further terrorist attacks. However, events like the anthrax letters, the 
Boston Marathon bombing, the Fort Hood massacre, the Chattanooga recruiting office 
attack and the Orlando nightclub shootings show that the U.S. in still extremely 
vulnerable. These attacks were textbook examples of attempted Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD)- (anthrax letters) or lone wolf-styled (Boston, Fort Hood, 
Chattanooga, Orlando) attacks. Based on proven effectiveness of recent examples I 
would argue that there exists an even greater threat than WMD or lone-wolf attacks to 
U.S. homeland security: a small-group, “swarm”-based terror attack. 
 
 In this chapter, I examine four separate cases: an asymmetrical conflict, a U.S. 
military exercise, and two terrorist attacks. These cases highlight the threat posed by and 
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the effectiveness of a “swarm”-styled terrorist attack. WMD- and lone wolf-based attacks 
do pose a threat to domestic security in the United States; however, I intend to show that 
the greatest threat, capable of producing the more damaging result inside U.S. borders 
and easier to pull off, does not come from a suitcase nuke, dirty bomb, or from a lone 
fanatic, but from a small, coordinated group of motivated individuals: the swarm. 
. 
 “Swarming” 
 Swarming is a military tactic to overwhelm a target through multiple, 
simultaneous attacks by small, loosely-coordinated groups. In other words, while 
“swarming is seemingly amorphous, … it is a deliberately structured, coordinated, 
strategic way to strike from all directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force 
and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off positions.”
54
 From this broad definition, 
scholars have focused more closely on swarming as a military tactic. For example, one 
study defined swarming as occurring “when several units conduct a convergent attack on 
a target from multiple axes…. Attacks can either be long range fires or close range fire 
and hit-and-run attacks.”
55
 The use of swarming, according to this definition, can be 
found in many historic conflicts including during the Chechen Wars, by the Mongols, by 
the Russians during Napoleon‟s retreat, by the Finns during the Winter War against the 
Russians, and by the Afghans against the Soviets in the 1980s.
56
 In fact, “against a 
conventional adversary…the swarming of directed fires should have devastating 
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effects.”
57
 This paper intends to highlight the lethality, and emphasize the threat posed to 
the United States by a domestic terrorist swarm attack. 
 
Literature Review 
The threat of WMD-oriented terror attacks 
 Some domestic security professionals consider it unlikely that a terrorist group 
will use a WMD against the United States for the foreseeable future. In fact, a 2012 study 
by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) examined the possibility of a WMD attack and 
concluded that “in the past decade, there is no evidence that jihadist extremists in the 
United States have acquired or attempted to acquire material to construct CBRN 
weapons.”
58
 Another study points out that more lives were claimed in a conventional 
bombing (Oklahoma City) than in a WMD attack (Tokyo subway Sarin gas attacks), and 
goes on to emphasize that WMDs also pose a serious threat to the terrorist group trying to 
construct them.
59
  
 However, a (contradictory) study published by NTI illustrates how it is possible to 
fabricate and deploy bio-weapons with only a college-level understanding of 
microbiology and basic lab equipment,
60
 and thus a WMD terrorist attack should not be 
considered outside the realm of possibility. A report published by Harvard‟s Belfer 
Center found that “despite the non-occurrence of a WMD attack in the U.S. up until now, 
it would be foolish to discount the possibility that such an event will occur in the 
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future.”
61
 This back-and-forth appears endemic to the debate, with no one able to present 
concrete evidence of the WMD capabilities of terrorist organizations.  
Ultimately, there seems to be little consensus in the unclassified literature 
available to either support or deny the likelihood of a pending, successful WMD terror 
attack in the United States by terrorist organizations – purportedly, they lack the 
necessary infrastructure and technical requirements
62
, yet others claim that the 
technology and ability is within their reach. Given that WMDs are a low-probability, 
maximum-impact event, trying to prevent one can theoretically take the entire economic 
output of a country with little discernable improvement in actual prevention. 
 
The threat of lone wolf-oriented terror attacks 
 According to the National Security Critical Issue Task Force (NSCITF), there is 
no official U.S. government definition of “lone wolf attack.”
63
 The NSCITF defines a 
lone-wolf attack as:  
the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or threat 
of violence committed by a single actor who pursues political change 
linked to a formulated ideology, whether his own or that of a larger 
organization, and who does not receive orders, direction, or material 
support from outside sources.
64
 
 
 Examples of recent lone wolf attacks in the United States include shootings in 
Chattanooga, TN
65
; Fort Hood, TX
66
; and Orlando, FL
67
; and the attempted bombing in 
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Times Square, New York City. Internationally, the 2011 attacks in Norway carried out by 
Anders Brevik and the 2015 Hyper Cacher kosher market attack in France are considered 
to be textbook examples of a lone-wolf attack. Profiling and detecting individuals 
planning lone-wolf attacks can be exceedingly difficult.
68
 In fact, “there is no standard 
profile for the American lone wolf terrorist.”
69
 This difficulty in creating a profile means 
that it can be very hard to detect and interdict a lone-wolf terrorist before he or she 
commits their attack. Despite the nebulous nature of both the definition of the attack and 
profiling of the executors, as a strategy lone-wolf attacks provide an excellent means for 
Islamic terrorists to “terrorize the West…asymmetrically.”
70
  
Despite several high-profile incidents, lone-wolf attacks by terrorists in the United 
States are not on the rise,
71
 and are not one of the most significant threats to public 
safety.
72
 In fact, between 2009 and 2012, cases of lone wolf terrorist attacks in the U.S. 
declined overall, although they did see a slight increase from 2012 to 2014
73
. While the 
frequency of lone-wolf attacks seems to be in doubt, the common consensus is that these 
attacks typically do not kill many people.
74
 One of the few exceptions to this is the attack 
carried out by Anders Brevik, who killed 77 people.
75
 Lone-wolf attacks might be 
effective in certain settings, but they are not generally seen as a viable tactic for Islamist 
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terrorist groups to create mass-casualty events. Instead, the main strength of lone-wolf 
attacks seems to lie in their ability to create a major psychological impact with relatively 
little actual violence to the general population or to physical infrastructure.  
 
The threat of swarm-oriented terror attacks 
 Literature on this subject covered a wide range of arenas, from academia to 
government, books to news articles. There is markedly little dissent on the continued 
threat posed by a swarm-style terrorist attack.
76
 In analyzing the case studies presented in 
this chapter, I attempt to draw on as wide a range of material as possible. 
 One of my prime sources, written for a government think tank, has served as a 
cornerstone for numerous works concerning the use of swarm tactics in a military or 
terrorist setting, including two of the case studies in this paper. Written to study the 
benefits, costs, and risks of engaging in swarm tactics, 
77
 the authors also examine the 
role of technology in enabling swarming as a tactic.
78
 They argue that swarming is the 
“fourth form” of warfare, the next step following the previous three: the melee, massing, 
and maneuver warfare.
79
 Pertaining to terrorist attacks, this source emphasizes several 
characteristics of swarming: “autonomous or semi-autonomous units engaging in 
convergent assault on a common target” and “many small, dispersed, „internetted‟ 
maneuver units.”
80
 This source also highlights the fact that “when swarming works, it 
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[works] very well, [and often acts] as a force multiplier.”
81
 It is also quick to warn that 
the U.S. will “increasingly face swarming by adversaries,” from nation-states as well as 
terrorist and transnational criminal organizations.
82
  
 Another think-tank report observes that “insurgents are employing swarming as a 
form of asymmetric warfare against superior conventional armies from the mountains of 
Afghanistan to the cities of Iraq.”
83
 The report also points to one the most effective 
aspects of swarm tactics that is that “swarms must be offensive at the tactical level.”
84
 
This is true both in military and terrorist applications of swarm tactics, and is seen in both 
case studies I present involving terrorist attacks (Mumbai in 2008 and Paris in 2015). The 
report also concludes that “suicide swarms” (swarms where the members are willing to 
fight to the death) “also seek devastating results in a short amount of time”
85
.  
 The rest of my sources range from think-tanks such as The Washington Institute, 
articles published in Foreign Policy and The New York Times and other news sources, 
government-sponsored studies, and academic and journalistic essays. Overwhelming, 
these sources discuss the effectiveness of swarming, particularly when used against larger 
opponents. There is very little literature that I have found that argues against the 
effectiveness of swarming as a tactic. Whether the lack of arguments against swarming‟s 
effectiveness is due to lack of effort on the part of academia or the fact that swarming is 
undeniably effective, I am not certain. I feel that this lack of counter-arguments 
strengthens my argument – whereas the literature regarding WMD and lone-wolf attacks 
is at best ambiguous regarding the efficacy, impact and likelihood of those tactics, the 
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opinions surrounding the effectiveness of swarming as a tactic are unanimous in their 
affirmation. 
 While there is an abundance of literature regarding the effectiveness of swarming 
as a tactic, the majority of sources focus on its applicability in a military setting. 
Swarming as an effective terrorist tactic has received relatively little attention, which is 
an issue I hope to address in this paper. The case studies I present, in conjunction with the 
sources I have found on swarming, will demonstrate why the United States should fear a 
swarm-style terrorist attack within its borders. 
 
Methodology 
 The overall purpose of this paper is to illustrate the effectiveness of swarming 
when compared to WMD and lone-wolf tactics, by examining cases of swarm-tactic 
implementation in a variety of real-world scenarios. This paper utilizes four case studies 
to examine recent historical events in which swarming was used as a decisive tactic. 
These are: 
 the First Chechen War, specifically the Battles of Grozny in the mid-1990s, in 
which Chechen separatists repelled a larger, better-equipped Russian army and 
utilized swarming tactics to inflict catastrophic casualties;  
 the 2002 U.S. military exercise Millennium Challenge, where a simulated U.S. 
carrier group was sunk in the opening minutes of the exercise by a wily Marine 
general employing swarm tactics on a tactical and strategic level; 
 the 2008 terror attack in Mumbai, when ten members of Lashkar-e-Taiba staged a 
commando-style sea raid and used swarm tactics against targets in the bustling 
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Indian city of Mumbai, instigating an assault that would last several days and 
require military intervention to end; 
 the 2015 terror attack in Paris, where seven supporters of Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL) staged a swarm attack against cafes, restaurants, a sports 
stadium, and a theatre in the middle Paris that, despite lasting only a few hours, 
caused a similar number of casualties to the attack in Mumbai several years prior. 
 
Case studies as a methodology are advantageous since they allow for the 
researcher to conduct comparisons on a variety of levels. I can compare not only between 
the actual outcomes of events and theories proposed by existing literature, but also 
examine the effectiveness of swarming on a case-by-case basis. This multi-faceted 
examination allows for the construction of a thorough examination of the effectiveness of 
swarming from both theoretical and real-world applications. 
The literature on terrorist attacks provides little in the way of methodology 
comparison – at no point was I able to find a study which broke down how various tactics 
used by terrorists to conduct an attack compared against one another. The literature on 
WMD and lone-wolf attacks by terrorists is extensive, discussing both past events and 
future implications, but I was unable to find a direct “X tactic has been proven to kill 
more people than Y tactic” discussion anywhere. This paper will hopefully provide that 
missing component, examining swarming across a number of case studies and then 
comparing the real-world results against those from WMD and lone-wolf terrorist attacks.  
All four case studies involve the use of swarming by a numerically- and 
technologically-inferior participants.  While the first two case studies focus on military 
actions (Battles of Grozny and Millennium Challenge 2002), the latter two case studies 
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examine swarming tactics in recent terrorist attacks (Mumbai in 2008 and Paris in 2015). 
As my thesis posits that a swarm-style terrorist attack poses a greater threat to U.S. 
domestic security than a WMD or lone-wolf attack, these final two cases studies will 
prove to be especially important in validating my argument. 
The main downside to case studies as a methodology is favoritism – picking cases 
that only highlight the specific points desired by the author. To counter this, cases have 
been chosen that examine the use of swarming in military conflicts and where swarming 
was used to conduct terrorist attacks. In doing so, the versatility and effectiveness of 
swarming in both military and terrorist applications is demonstrated. 
 
Case Studies 
 
Case Study #1 – The First Chechen War: The First and Second Battles of Grozny 
Background  
 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, former satellite countries declared their 
independence from the former superpower. One of these was the Chechen Republic of 
Ichkeria (Chechnya). In the years following its establishment, thousands upon thousands 
of non-Chechen citizens fled the country, claiming violent discrimination and 
persecution.
86
 This led to a civil war within Chechnya. The Russians initially provided 
covert support to pro-Russian Chechen groups, but when diplomacy failed, the decision 
was made to send Russian military forces into Chechnya to quell the conflict.
87
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Recognizing their disadvantages, the majority of Chechen forces withdrew to the capital 
city of Grozny and prepared for battle.
88
 
 
The Battles for Grozny 
 While both Chechen and Russian forces had similar small- and medium-arms and 
equipment, the Chechens faced a decided disadvantage in air power, armor, and heavy 
weapons. To maximize their effectiveness, Chechen fire-teams consisting of three to four 
men would operate in loose conjunction, attacking Russian armor and infantry columns 
from a variety of directions and angles (basement, middle stories, rooftops) at the same 
time.
89
 These simultaneous, multi-pronged attacks allowed the Chechens to inflict 
massive casualties upon the Russian forces, who found that “against the swarm, their 
tactics were still mostly ineffective.”
90
 Even Russia‟s special operations troops were 
challenged. By the time the second battle of Grozny commenced, Russian military forces 
were almost helpless before the swarming Chechen fighters.
91
 
 The use of swarming tactics by Chechen forces permitted them to deal Russia 
some of its worst military losses since World War II. For example, in one instance, a 
brigade consisting of over 1000 men and approximately 142 armored vehicles was 
completely wiped out in only sixty hours.
92
 The Chechens would claim to have destroyed 
over 400 Russian tanks and Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) by the end of the New 
Year‟s Eve battle.
93
 Swarming also allowed small Chechen fire teams to bog down much 
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larger Russian forces within Grozny, while other Chechen units simultaneously attacked 
Russian logistics and support forces outside the city, which severely impacted Russian 
morale (not to mention logistics for the troops in the city).
94
 
 The First Chechen War, during which the First and Second Battles of Grozny 
were waged, ended with Chechen forces still in control of Grozny, despite an 
overwhelming numerical and materiel advantage held by the Russians. While many 
reasons have been offered as to why the Russians lost (poor training, low morale, 
conflicting chains of command), a major cause of the Russian loss was the use of 
swarming tactics by Chechen forces.
95
 
 
Case Study #2 – Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02) 
Background 
 Millennium Challenge 2002 (MC02) was a joint military exercise conducted by 
the United States military that, at the time, was the largest war-game ever conducted by 
the U.S.
96
 It involved over 13,500 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, and aimed to 
“assess the ability of a Joint Task Force (JTF) to execute the Rapid Decisive Operations 
(RDO) war-fighting concept.”
97
 In the exercise, the U.S. task force (the Blue team) would 
face off against an unspecified Middle-East-based country (the Red team, purported to be 
Iran).
98
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While the U.S. force involved a carrier battle group, augmented with a Marine 
amphibious detachment, the Red team was severely behind the curve in regards to 
technology, capabilities, and armament.
99
 The exercise was designed to be a free-play 
exercise; however, either team was capable of winning.
100
 
 
MC02 
 The exercise started when the Blue Team issued the Red Team an ultimatum 
communication demanding their surrender within 24 hours; Lieutenant General Paul Van 
Riper, commander of the Red Team, decided to exploit Blue Team‟s false perception that 
they had “a monopoly on perception.”
101
 In order to foil Blue Team‟s advanced signal-
gathering and communications-jamming equipment, Van Riper had dispersed his forces 
and utilized motorcycle messengers, light signals, and messages broadcast from mosque 
minarets to signal to his disparate forces. Able to communicate without interference, once 
the U.S. carrier group came into range LtGen Van Riper initiated his attack. 
 Aware of U.S. military defensive capabilities and his own inability to match them 
conventionally, LtGen Van Riper implemented a sweeping swarm-style attack against the 
U.S. carrier group. 
“Riper‟s forces unleashed a barrage of missiles from ground-based 
launchers, commercial ships, and planes flying low and without radio 
communications to reduce their radar signature. Simultaneously, swarms 
of speedboats loaded with explosives launched kamikaze attacks.”
102
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The carrier battle group found itself completely overwhelmed: 19 U.S. 
ships were sunk, including a carrier, several cruisers, and five amphibious 
ships.
103
 In an interview afterwards, LtGen Van Riper admitted after the exercise 
that “the whole thing was over in five, maybe ten minutes.”
104
 Despite being 
drastically outnumbered and lacking in both resources and technology, in the 
opening move of the exercise LtGen Van Riper‟s swarm attack had pre-empted a 
U.S. strike, decimated one of the most powerful naval formations in existence, 
and inflicted thousands of casualties. When asked about his actions after the 
exercise, LtGen Van Riper stated “if it was going to be a fight, I was going to get 
in the first blow.”
105
 The use of swarm tactics allowed for the first blow to be a 
decisive one that shocked everyone involved in the exercise.
106
 
 
Case Study #3: 2008 Terrorist Attack in Mumbai 
Background 
 In November 2008, ten terrorists conducted an attack in the city of 
Mumbai, India that lasted nearly three days and “set a gold standard for how a 
small group of suicidal fanatics can paralyze a major city, attract global attention, 
and terrorize a continent.”
107
 In the aftermath of the attack, concrete ties linking 
the ten terrorists to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan surfaced.
108
 Prior to the 
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attack, an initial group of approximately twenty-five terrorist operatives received 
training (including weapons, tactics, assault, and amphibious raiding
109
) at an LeT 
camp in Pakistan.
110
 Three senior LeT operatives took command of the seven 
trainees who passed, and the group divided into five pairs, with each pair 
receiving a different target around South Mumbai‟s waterfront.
111
 Site 
reconnaissance by spies and Google Earth presented the terrorists with a detailed, 
in-depth assessment of the area, which allowed the terrorists to achieve 
familiarization with the environment well before the attack.
 112
 
 
60 Hours  
 In order to infiltrate the city of Mumbai, the attackers hijacked an Indian 
fishing boat, from which they launched two rubber dinghies to reach the shoreline 
along the Mumbai waterfront.
113
 Once ashore, the group divided into their pre-
determined teams and made their way to their initial targets. These included: the 
Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (Victoria Station) Rail Station, the Leopold Café 
and Taj Mahal Hotel, the Oberoi Trident Hotel, and the Narimann (Chabad) 
House (a Jewish community center). 
114
 The attackers also placed numerous time-
delayed bombs in cabs and at target locations prior to and during the attack in 
order to sow further confusion. 
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 Once the attack began, the terrorists exploited the initial chaos and moved 
rapidly from target to target, leaving first responders behind.
115
 The terrorists 
struck several locations at once, and in conjunction with their mobility prevented 
first responders from developing an accurate picture of the situation.
116
 This 
overwhelmed Indian law enforcement, which was not equipped nor trained to 
handle a swarm-style attack of this magnitude. The attackers were thus able to 
make their way towards their ultimate objectives (the Taj Mahal Hotel and the 
Narimann (Chabad) House) and gain entrance with relative ease. Only once they 
were ensconced in these redoubts, and the attack shifted from an urban swarm 
attack to an urban siege, were Indian law enforcement and military forces able to 
commence operations to bring the attack to a close. By the time law enforcement 
ended the siege and brought the attacks to a close, 166 people were dead, and over 
600 wounded in the attack. 
Case Study #4: 2015 Terrorist Attack in Paris 
Background 
 As 2015 drew to a close, the security situation in France was tense. 
Terrorist attacks in January, committed by ISIS supporters, had killed seventeen 
people and wounded another twenty-two, which resulted in heightened security 
posture and increased border checks in France.
117
 Nine attackers participated in 
the attack; all were EU citizens who entered France despite being known 
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terrorism suspects.
118
 Based in Belgium, the attackers brought explosive belts and 
automatic weapons into Paris with them, despite the strict border control measures 
in place by the French. 
 
“On est parti on commence”
119
 
 As in Mumbai, the attackers launched near-simultaneous attacks on 
separate targets to begin their assault, just after 9 PM.
120
 The attackers operated in 
three separate teams to maximize effectiveness and strike the greatest number of 
targets.
121
 Targets included a sports stadium, restaurants and cafes, and a concert 
hall.
122
 Moving quickly from target to target, the attackers also utilized suicide 
bombings in conjunction with automatic weapons in order to create the greatest 
number of casualties and heighten confusion.
123
 The focal point of the attack 
became the Bataclan theatre, where three attackers opened fire on a packed 
concert hall, before taking dozens of hostages and beginning an urban siege.
124
 
Unlike Mumbai, however, within four hours seven of the attackers would be dead 
(the remaining two would be killed in a police raid several weeks later), but 
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despite lasting less than four hours, the Paris attacks would still result in 130 
victims killed, and another 368 wounded. 
 
Analysis 
 The four case studies provide definitive examples where swarming allowed for a 
numerically- and technologically-disadvantaged force to inflict severe, in some cases 
catastrophic, casualties on the opposing force. The battles for Grozny and 2002‟s 
Millennium Challenge illustrated swarming‟s effectiveness in a military setting – the 
former involved the Russian military suffering its worst defeat since World War II, while 
the latter involved a military exercise designed to last two weeks coming to an abrupt halt 
within the first fifteen minutes due to catastrophic simulated losses to the U.S. forces. 
The Chechen rebels and LtGen Van Riper both utilized swarming tactics to compensate 
for their numerical and technological disadvantages to confuse, out-maneuver, and 
overwhelm their respective opponents. Their opponents, despite having almost every 
perceivable advantage, were unable to mount an effective defense or counter-attack. 
Considering the results, these two case studies leave little doubt about swarming‟s 
efficacy in a military setting. 
 The second two case studies examine swarming not in a military context, but in 
the arena of terror attacks. These case studies, which examine the attack in Mumbai in 
2008 and the attack in Paris in November 2015, are particularly important for my thesis 
as I attempt to show that a swarm-style attack poses a far greater threat to U.S. domestic 
security than a WMD or lone-wolf attack. In both cases, less than a dozen men managed 
to inflict several hundred casualties and shut down major cities. Both cases illustrate the 
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brutal effectiveness of swarm-based tactics in an urban environment – occurrences that 
will likely become more common as more of the population shifts towards urban 
centers.
125
 
 To further illustrate the effectiveness of swarm-based attacks by terrorists, Figure 
1 shows the total casualty tally in selected terrorist attacks. These include the casualties 
from two WMD (one chemical warfare, the other biological warfare) attacks, two lone-
wolf style attacks (one on an Army base in Texas, the other a nightclub in Florida), and 
two swarm-style attacks (in two modern international cities). Casualty tallies on the graph 
include both killed and wounded, and do not include the deaths of the attackers in the 
tally
126
. 
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Figure 1 – Terror Attack Casualty Comparison 
 
As Figure 1 shows, a large disparity exists between casualties for WMD, lone-
wolf, and swarm attacks. More than twice the people were killed and injured in the Paris 
November 2015 attacks than in all the non-swarm attacks listed. Even when the number 
of attackers in each of the swarm-based attacks is factored in (ten in Mumbai, seven in 
Paris), each attacker inflicts an average of 76.6 casualties in Mumbai and 71.1 casualties 
in Paris – far more casualties than many lone-wolf style attacks have inflicted. 
 
WMD, lone-wolf, or swarm? 
As discussed previously, while there is little consensus on the likelihood of a 
terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon in the United States, there was agreement that 
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violent non-state actors appear to be far from acquiring the technological and engineering 
expertise necessary to fabricate, transport, and detonate a nuclear device
127
. A similar 
situation appears to exist for chemical and biological weapons. The perceived 
unlikelihood that a terrorist group would use a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon 
exists because of the relatively high barrier of entry of WMD attacks
128
. They can be very 
complicated to manufacture, transport and deploy. 
Lone-wolf attacks are easier for terrorist groups to motivate and execute. All that 
is required is an individual willing to kill and possibly be killed. As mentioned earlier, 
these individuals are hard for law enforcement to detect and therefore prevent
129
. As lone-
wolves, however, they are capable of executing attacks of significant impact. Ultimately, 
they are constrained because law enforcement must stop only a sole operator and one 
man can only do so much to wage a terror attack. 
Swarm tactics implemented by a small group of individuals, while more complex 
to organize, are shown in the case studies of this chapter to be a force multiplier, whether 
they are used by military units or terrorists. Some critics might argue that the necessary 
training, and potentially smuggling a trained group of individuals with equipment into a 
target country, might serve as a barrier to entry and inhibit these sorts of attacks from 
happening. Yet in both Mumbai and Paris these supposed difficulties proved to be 
insufficient to stop the terrorists. In Mumbai, the attackers received extensive training, 
conducting mock amphibious raids and practicing commando tactics before covertly 
infiltrating Mumbai by sea. In Paris, several of the attackers had previously travelled to 
Syria to fight alongside ISIS, and French intelligence flagged all of them as terror 
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suspects; despite this, they re-entered the EU and passed through heightened French 
border security with military-grade small arms and explosive suicide belts. In both 
Mumbai and Paris, these small groups used swarm-style tactics to create a level of 
destruction that no WMD or lone-wolf attack has been able to approach. 
 
Conclusion 
 In the last two decades, the United States has faced an increased threat of 
domestic terror attacks. The goal of this paper was to argue that swarm-tactic terrorist 
attacks pose a greater threat, and can result in greater damage, than WMD or lone wolf-
based terror attacks. 
 At the time of writing, there have been no swarm-tactic terrorist attacks conducted 
within the United States. There has been one chemical WMD attack (the anthrax letters in 
late 2001) and numerous lone-wolf attacks conducted in the U.S. since 2001. However, 
the absence of a terrorist swarm-attack thus far does not obviate the clear and significant 
risk such an attack poses. I examined four case studies in this chapter where swarm 
tactics proved decisive: the Russian siege of Grozny, Chechnya in the 90s; the U.S. 
military exercise Millennium Challenge 2002; and two real-world terror attacks, in 
Mumbai in 2008 and Paris in 2015.  
The Chechens in Grozny utilized swarm tactics to counter the decisive armor and 
numerical advantage held by the Russian military forces seeking to seize Grozny – the 
battle ended in a Chechen victory, with the Russian forces suffering their worst losses 
since World War II. In Millennium Challenge 2002, the commander of the “Red” 
opposing force applied swarm tactics to missile, small-boat, and aviation assets – this led 
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to the attacking U.S. carrier battle group suffering almost total destruction in the first 
fifteen minutes of the exercise. In Mumbai in 2008 and Paris in 2015, trained groups of 
attackers equipped with small arms and explosives infiltrated bustling urban centers and 
conducted devastating attacks on multiple targets using swarm tactics, overwhelming 
local law enforcement; the attack in Mumbai lasted nearly three days, the attack in Paris 
over in a matter of hours due to the rapid use of explosive suicide vests by the attackers. 
Comparing recent WMD, lone-wolf, and swarm-tactic terrorist attacks, the 
disparity in casualties between the first two types of attack compared to swarm-tactic 
attacks is utterly lopsided. Compared to the least deadly terrorist swarm attack (Paris in 
2015), the most deadly WMD attack (Sarin attacks in Tokyo, 1995) resulted in 
approximately one-tenth the number of casualties of the (62 killed/wounded versus 498 
killed/wounded); the most deadly lone-wolf attack (Pulse nightclub attack, 2016) only 
produced one-fifth the number of casualties (102 killed/wounded in Orlando versus 498 
killed/wounded in Paris). When one considers that most lone-wolf attacks result in 
significantly fewer casualties than the cases presented in this study, the gap in 
“effectiveness” (casualties resulting from the attack) only widens. 
While there is little disagreement that a successfully-employed WMD terrorist 
attack could result in catastrophic casualties, there is little consensus on the likelihood of 
such an attack occurring, and little evidence to support a pending attack in the future. 
Chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear improvised devices required tightly-
controlled, regulated, and tracked materials; constructing and moving such a device into 
the United States poses another set of problems to a potential terrorist. Overall, the barrier 
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to entry for terrorists to commit a WMD attack is well outside the reach of most terrorist 
groups. 
Far more likely, and easier to orchestrate, are lone-wolf terrorist attacks. The U.S. 
and Western Europe have experienced dozens of these attacks in the last few years. It is 
agreed-upon by those involved that locating and interdicting lone-wolf terrorists before 
they commit their attacks is difficult, if not impossible. While far more frequent in their 
occurrence, lone-wolf attacks are often limited by the fact that only one individual is 
involved. While occasionally resulting in significant casualties (Norway attacks, 2011; 
Pulse nightclub shooting in Florida, 2016; Nice, France in 2016), more often lone-wolf 
attacks results in far fewer casualties
130
. While lone-wolf attacks are increasing in 
frequency, they are not as damaging as attacks conducted by groups.
131
 
Critics might argue that the main weakness in swarm-based terror attacks is their 
reliance on groups of trained, equipped individuals. However, the attacks in Mumbai and 
Paris show that this is not the barrier some perceive it to be. The Mumbai attackers 
trained for months in Pakistan before conducting a covert, seaborne entry into Mumbai 
with all their equipment. Several of the Paris attackers fought in Syria, all were known to 
French intelligence agencies and were flagged for terrorist affiliations, and yet they were 
able to enter Europe and then France unimpeded, even though France‟s border security 
was on a heightened security footing due to terror attacks in January of 2015. 
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Furthermore, despite strict weapons restrictions within Europe, the attackers were able to 
bring military-grade small arms and explosive vests with them into France.  
With the extensive U.S. coastline, a porous border with Mexico, and the longest 
international border in the world between Canada and the U.S., it would be naïve and 
dangerous to believe that a group similar to those from Mumbai and Paris would be 
unable to enter into the United States covertly. Particularly vulnerable is the U.S. 
coastline: drug cartel narco-submarines reach it almost unimpeded; the U.S. Coast Guard, 
Navy, and Border Patrol interdict only 10-25% of all submarines which operate in the 
Pacific, Gulf of Mexico, and Atlantic (see Chapter 1 of this thesis for a more detailed 
analysis of these subs and cartel-Islamic terrorist group nexuses). These subs can 
transport up to 10 tons of cargo, which can consist of men and materiel should an Islamic 
terrorist group intent on conducting a swarm attack in the U.S. purchase use or transit on 
a cartel narco-sub. Once making landfall, the only challenge remaining to such a group 
would be movement to the target and execution of the attack. 
 
How to beat the swarm? 
 Determining detailed counters to potential swarm-based terror attacks could quite 
possibly fill at least one book, if not several. However, I feel it necessary to provide 
several potential ways the United States may be able to lessen the likelihood and severity 
of a terrorist swarm attack.  
First, construct a more robust maritime security apparatus, particularly to counter 
the threat posed by narco-submarines and potential underwater infiltration by attackers. 
Efforts to interdict narco-subs while they are being constructed, increased patrols and 
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passive surveillance/detection measures by U.S. assets in the region, and increased 
interagency cooperation in the U.S. and abroad could ultimately result in fewer narco-
submarines in operation and greater interdiction rates. This would remove a key means of 
terrorist operatives infiltrating the U.S. covertly and increase the risk of capture if 
terrorists sought to use narco-submarines to enter the U.S. 
 In the domestic arena, I see at least two key areas for focus. First, law 
enforcement and first responders should drill to combat a swarm-style attack. In 
particular, the drills should focus on reacting to multiple swarm attacks rapidly following 
one another, such that law enforcement itself does not swarm the first attack, thereby 
depriving nearby areas of protection. One of the primary reasons the attack in Mumbai 
lasted sixty hours was law enforcement‟s lack of experience in dealing with such an 
attack, and coordination issues between law enforcement and military agencies. French 
anti-terrorism units, on the other hand, were quick to respond and contain the attackers in 
Paris, which helped restrict their movement (a key facet of a successful swarm attack) 
and limit casualties. U.S. law enforcement agencies should drill not only to respond to 
simultaneous attacks in multiple locations, but also to practice coordination and 
communication between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies – an activity 
worth practicing regardless of the type of event that might occur. Developing “swarm-
gaming” exercises, in conjunction with hostage, active shooter, and other scenarios faced 
by law enforcement, could also prove to be a critical tool in training to respond to swarm-
based terror attacks. 
 Second, continual assessment of security measures at potential targets by the U.S. 
security apparatus should continue. Physical pat-downs at the Stade de France in Paris 
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prevented attackers wearing suicide vests from entering during a crowded international 
soccer match in 2015, forcing the bombers to detonate outside the stadium. The attackers 
in Mumbai and Paris also targeted popular hotels, cafes and a concert hall. To counter 
swarm attacks, it is likely necessary to consider re-vamped security procedures for 
venues such as these. Furthermore, critical infrastructure can also be vulnerable to swarm 
attacks. Continual assessments of U.S. critical infrastructure to determine which assets 
require hardening and additional defensive measures could be important. The key 
emphasis here is not necessarily in implementing more defensive measures, but more 
effective defensive measures.  
 To conduct these assessments, the agencies tasked with the protection of key 
infrastructure can serve as a Red Team, planning and conducting swarm-style attacks on 
potential targets. This would likely allow law enforcement to assess current defense 
measures in place as well as learn how potential terrorist groups may attack the facility. 
Serving as the attacking force allows law enforcement to get inside the minds of potential 
attackers, and can provide valuable feedback to develop defensive and attack-response 
measures. Alternatively, the development of an AI/simulation program to practice 
theoretical “swarm-gaming” and simulate attacks against various facilities could provide 
a valuable tool, and potentially spot weaknesses that human observers had missed. 
 While the potential damage of a WMD attack and the rising frequency in lone-
wolf terror attacks is undeniable, neither is the fact that swarm-style terror attacks are far 
more destructive and thus pose a far greater threat to U.S. domestic security than either 
WMD or lone-wolf attacks. 
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Introduction 
 
 The last two decades have seen countless high-profile terror attacks around the 
world – the attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C. in 2001; the Mumbai urban siege in 2008; the attack in Paris in 
November 2015; the Bastille Day truck attack in France in 2016. One of the common 
themes linking all these attacks is that they focused on “impact” targets – public 
institutions and gatherings, theatres, hotels, athletic stadiums – with the attackers placing 
a premium on body count and global visibility. With the exception of the Pentagon in 
2001, none of the targets struck were military; almost all of those killed in these high-
profile terror attacks were civilians or law enforcement. 
 Since then, the countries that fell victim to these terror attacks have taken 
dramatic measures to lessen the viability of these attacks and prevent them from 
becoming a recurring nightmare. Increased security personnel during public gatherings 
and intensified security protocols around large public gatherings have served to harden 
these once-soft targets. Law enforcement agencies in major cities have trained to be far 
more adept at responding to burgeoning terror attacks, becoming more agile and efficient 
in their responses. While there is still a possibility of terror attacks against “soft” targets 
in large cities, such as theatres, sports arenas, and hotels, the probability of terrorists 
achieving a similar successful high-visibility, high-body count attack appears to be 
decreasing. 
 However, what if terrorists planning a kinetic attack which sought to achieve a 
goal outside of a high body count and extensive press coverage? What if the goal is to 
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conduct an attack that resulted in fewer bodies on the ground initially, but has the 
potential for significant, or catastrophic, long-term economic and environmental effects? 
Such an attack would be a marked change in strategy to past terror attacks. 
In this paper I will seek to answer the following question: does the United States 
possess specific weaknesses or chokepoints within key energy and economic 
infrastructure that terrorists could target with a kinetic attack to cause massive economic, 
energy, and/or environmental damage? While such an attack might not create the same 
high body count and terror as some of the aforementioned attacks, I believe the results of 
a successful terrorist attack on a key infrastructure target make these viable targets worth 
examining, and protecting. 
 
Literature Review 
 Broadly speaking, the literature concerning U.S. critical infrastructure 
vulnerability to terrorist attack highlights two main sources of threats: cyber-attacks, and 
kinetic attacks. Within each there is further discussion on the vulnerability of various sub-
sectors of the national infrastructure: water
132
, electricity, petroleum, economy, 
transportation. 
 Cyber-attacks seem to take the lion‟s share of the attention and concern: the U.S. 
Army Training Command‟s Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) Handbook 
No. 1.02, Critical Infrastructure Threats and Terrorism mentions cyber-attacks in the 
opening pages of the Handbook
133
. The discussion on cyber-attacks then proceeds to 
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consume the majority of the remainder of the handbook, receiving three sections‟ worth 
of attention to the one chapter on physical attacks. The Department of Homeland 
Security‟s (DHS) webpage on Critical Infrastructure Security also provides a robust 
discussion on cyber-security and the risk of cyber-attacks to U.S. infrastructure
134
. DHS‟ 
Energy Sector-Specific Plan 2015
135
 and Dams Sector-Specific Plan 2015
136
 both discuss 
the threat posed by cyber-attacks. ICF International released a report in June 2016 
examining the security and resilience of the U.S. electrical grid; cyber-attacks receive a 
length analysis in this report as well
137
. Numerous recent
138
 news
139
 reports
140
 also devote 
significant
141
 discussion
142
 and analysis
143
 to the threat posed by cyber-attacks to U.S. 
critical infrastructure. 
 The threat of physical attacks to key infrastructure seems to have taken a back 
seat to the threat posed by cyber-attacks. In several of the aforementioned sources 
(Handbook No. 1.02, DHS‟ Energy-Sector Specific and Dam-Sector Specific plans) 
physical attacks receive noticeably less discussion and analysis than cyber-attacks. ICF 
International‟s report pays equal attention to both threats, but my research showed far less 
discussion, and thus concern, of physical attacks posing a significant threat to key U.S. 
infrastructure. Similarly, there is little discussion or analysis of current physical security 
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measures – this is logical considering the sensitive as well as public nature of several of 
the examined installations, but the author‟s personal observations of security personnel 
and protocols at several of the discussed locations gives the impression of minimal, 
predominantly passive security measures.  
 Furthermore, a trend amongst all literature found is a lack of specific discussion 
regarding vulnerabilities. General discussion of the vulnerabilities of various 
infrastructure sectors to cyber and physical attacks abounds – however, there is little in 
the way of specificity in discussing these vulnerabilities. Nor is there much discussion 
regarding prioritizing infrastructure sectors; only DCSINT‟s Handbook 1.02 places 
primacy on one specific infrastructure sector (energy)
144
. Also, protection from natural 
disasters is a common thread of discussion, occurring concurrent with analyzing threats 
from cyber and physical attacks in much of the literature; ICF International‟s report is the 
only one which focuses specifically on “adversarial threats”
145
 to critical infrastructure. 
 Worth examining is also the literature of those who might seek to strike at the 
United States. In November of 2004, Al-Jazeera released a transcript of Osama bin 
Laden‟s most recent tape – in it, the then-leader of Al-Qaeda highlighted that one of Al-
Qaeda‟s primary goals was to “[continue] this policy in bleeding America to the point of 
bankruptcy.”
146
 In the video transcript, Bin Laden also goes on to observe that “every 
dollar of Al Qaeda [defeats] a million dollars [of the United States]”, causes job loss, and 
that the “real loser…is the American people and their economy”
147
. Bin Laden‟s focus 
was not on killing Americans per se – that simply provided a means to an end, which in 
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Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda‟s aim was to provoke a military response from the United 
States, and force the U.S. to commit significant time and treasure towards fighting Al-
Qaeda. Al-Qaeda and those sympathetic to Al-Qaeda can easily continue this “bleed-
until-bankruptcy”
148
 plan by striking not at people, but at key economic and energy 
infrastructure nodes within the United States, and using the resulting economic and 
environmental damage to force the United States to spend money that might elsewise go 
towards counterterrorism operations overseas. 
 The dearth of successful examples of terrorist-lead cyber-attacks, coupled with 
successful physical attacks against U.S. infrastructure in the past
149
 and the former leader 
of Al-Qaeda emphasizing the focus on financially damaging the United States, leads this 
author to focus on kinetic attacks as the primary threat facing U.S. critical infrastructure.  
The purpose of this paper is to highlight specific cases within the U.S. energy, 
environmental, and economic infrastructure that are uniquely vulnerable to kinetic 
terrorist attacks that, if damaged, would create significant and long-lasting economic and 
environmental impacts whose financial costs would place a significant burden on the U.S. 
economy and the average American. By highlighting specific cases of infrastructure 
vulnerability, the goal is to force accountability and drive discussion of counters to 
potential kinetic attacks, and ideally precipitate effective action in addressing these 
weaknesses. 
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Methodology 
 This paper uses four separate case studies to analyze targets across the U.S. 
domestic infrastructure and economic spectrum to highlight key nodes which present 
themselves as targets to a kinetic terrorist attacks. These are: 
 The Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams, located in Arizona and Utah respectively. 
Both straddle the Colorado River. Their vulnerability lies not in terrorists 
attempting to breech the dams themselves; instead, the weakness in both these 
facilities from a counterterrorism standpoint lies in their transformers – large, 
custom-built pieces of equipment that sit exposed at the bases of the dams, take 
months to replace, and without which the dams are incapable of producing 
electricity. 
 The Ports of Houston and Corpus Christi. These are two of the busiest ports in the 
United States, and key locations for the majority of the U.S. petroleum refining 
and unloading facilities. Their vulnerability to kinetic attack lies in both the 
refinery facilities, and the anchored petroleum tankers waiting to offload. 
 The Louisiana Offshore Oil Port. Located just off the coast of Louisiana, this 
complex is responsible for offloading petroleum tankers too big to enter 
Galveston or Houston. Both the facility and anchored petroleum tankers awaiting 
offloading are vulnerable to kinetic attacks. 
 The oil/petroleum storage facilities in Cushing, Oklahoma. This facility is a nexus 
of major pipelines and constitutes the majority of the U.S. oil reserve. 
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Case studies as a methodology are fitting in this scenario for a number of reasons. 
Case studies allow for a researcher to conduct comparisons across a variety of levels. I 
can compare each case study to the existing literature on an individual basis, as well as 
compare case study examples to one another. This versatility allows me to build a 
thought-out, thorough examination of viable economic and infrastructure nodes that 
provide viable targets for a kinetic terrorist attack. 
All four case studies involve targets which are vulnerable to attack by small groups of 
lightly-armed men, similar to the groups who carried out the Mumbai attacks in 2008 and 
the Paris attacks in November of 2015. One case study examines two major nodes in the 
U.S. electrical infrastructure in the American West – the Hoover and Glen Canyon dams. 
The other three involve, to one degree or another, elements of the oil and petroleum 
infrastructure in the U.S., as well as major ports (Case Study #2 – Ports of Galveston and 
Houston).  The case studies examine targets vulnerable to attack from air, land, and sea; a 
successful attack on any of these targets could result in economic, environmental, and 
infrastructure damage in place of the traditional high-body count from a terror attack. 
Additionally, the case studies examine targets that range from rural to major urban 
locations – this plays a role in the scale and ability of a law enforcement response to any 
terror attack. 
The biggest disadvantage of using case studies as a methodology is the risk of 
favoritism – where the researcher intentionally chooses cases which validate the theory 
being explored. This academic “cherry-picking” weakens the researcher‟s argument by 
failing to present a well-rounded argument. To avoid this, the cases examined in this 
paper cover a wide range of infrastructure, from electrical grid, to oil/petroleum, to 
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shipping, and concern possible targets which are located in both rural and urban 
locations. This highlights the viability of a kinetic small-unit terrorist attack capable of 
producing significant economic and environmental impacts. 
 
Case Studies 
Case Study #1 – the Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams 
Hoover Dam 
 Built from 1931-1936, Hoover Dam is a major lynchpin in water distribution, 
electricity generation, and tourism – approximately seven million people tour the dam 
each year
150
. Located on the border of Arizona and Nevada, Hoover Dam impounds the 
Colorado River, creating Lake Mead, the largest reservoir in the United States. 
Responsible for controlling water flow to numerous Western states, including Arizona, 
Nevada, and California, one of Hoover Dam‟s primary functions is generating electricity 
through hydropower. Still one of the nation‟s largest hydroelectric operations, despite its 
age, Hoover Dam provides power to over 1.3 million households
151
. 
 
Glen Canyon Dam 
 Farther upstream on the Colorado River, Glen Canyon Dam creates Lake Powell, 
another of the largest man-made reservoirs in the United States. Opened some thirty years 
after the Hoover Dam, Glen Canyon Dam also plays a vital role in irrigation and power 
generation for the Western United States. Hoover Dam is the largest producer of 
hydroelectric energy in the southwestern U.S.; Glen Canyon Dam is the second-largest. A 
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key component of the Colorado River Storage Project
152
, the Glen Canyon Dam also 
provides electricity to approximately five million people across Arizona, Colorado, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming
153
. Glen Canyon Dam also serves as the cold-
start energy source for secondary power plants in the region, providing the electric boost 
necessary to bring other plants online. 
 
High Voltage/Large Power Transformers 
 High Voltage (HV) transformers, also known as Large Power Transformers 
(LPTs), are in use at both the Hoover and Glen Canyon dams, as well as other key 
electrical infrastructure nodes around the United States. Extremely heavy, large, and 
usually custom-built for an application
154
, HV transformers are usually not 
interchangeable, nor are there extensive spare inventories due to the custom nature and 
high cost of HV transformers and their parts
155
. HV transformers can cost in excess of 
$10 million, not counting transportation and installation costs
156
In addition, the average 
lead time for a transformer varied from five to twelve months for domestic producers; 
international manufacturers see an average lead time of six to sixteen months from order 
to delivery
157
. Actual delivery of HV transformers can also prove challenging, as most 
transformers weigh hundreds of tons
158
 - one recent event required the hiring of a Russian 
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Antonov-225, the largest airplane in the world, to transport an HV transformer from 
Austria to Arizona
159
. 
At Hoover Dam, the HV transformers (indicated by arrows) are located on the 
wings along both sides of the base of the dam, as depicted below (Figure 2): 
 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Reclamation website, https://www.usbr.gov/lc/hooverdam/images/ramp.jpg 
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At the Glen Canyon Dam, the HV transformers (indicated by arrows) are located along 
the deck at the base of the dam (Figure 3): 
 
Source: Bureau of Reclamation website, https://www.usbr.gov/uc/img/gallery/gcd/images/6.jpg 
  
 
Case Study #2 – the Ports of Houston and Corpus Christi 
Port of Houston/Houston Shipping Channel 
 The Port of Houston and the corresponding fifty-mile-long Houston Shipping 
Channel makes up the second-busiest port, by volume, in the United States
160
. The 
numerous refining and petrochemical complexes also make the port of Houston a key 
node in the nation‟s petrochemical/refinery infrastructure, in addition to shipping 
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infrastructure
161
. Numerous terminals transfer a wide range of goods for import and 
export; Houston is the number-1 ranked U.S. port in foreign tonnage
162
, and most 
Volkswagen and Audi cars for sale in the U.S. pass through the Port of Houston
163
. This 
versatility in handling a wide range of goods, both foreign and domestic, from wheat to 
oil refining, makes the Port of Houston a critical component of both the U.S. shipping 
infrastructure, and also the U.S. domestic oil/gas infrastructure. 
 
Port of Corpus Christi 
 The Port of Corpus Christi, another Texas Gulf port like the Port of Houston, is 
ranked as the fifth-largest port in the U.S.
164
. Similar to the Port of Houston, the Port of 
Corpus Christi‟s top three commodities traded in 2014 were petroleum-based, including 
crude oil, fuel oil, gasoline, and diesel
165
. Wind turbines are another key commodity that 
passes through the Port of Corpus Christi in high quantities – Texas‟ surge to the top 
wind-energy producer in the U.S, and one of the highest in the world, has led to an 
increased demand for wind turbines. Like the Port of Houston and the Houston Shipping 
Channel, the Port of Corpus Christi possesses a forty-five-foot-deep main channel to 
handle all but the largest ship traffic. 
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Anchored off the coast 
 Despite their ability to handle high quantities of ship traffic, the Ports of Houston 
and Corpus Christi nonetheless require ships to anchor outside of the ports to await 
loading or offloading. This creates a naval “parking lot” just off the coast as ships wait to 
enter the port facilities. In addition, accidents and unforeseen circumstances can result in 
a further increase in anchored ships: in 2010, a barge crash which toppled power lines 
spanning the Houston Ship Channel idled 75% of the Port of Houston‟s terminals for at 
least three days
166
, and in November 2015 over 40 oil tankers were anchored off the coast 
due to a glut in global oil supply
167
, more than usual.  
Shipping backlogs have a knock-on effect as well – once the ports resume 
standard operational pace, they require additional time to process the increased number of 
waiting ships. This can result in dozens of ships anchored off the coast for weeks, or even 
months as the ports work overtime to sort through the backlog. The cost of this backlog 
can result in a severe economic impact, as well as supply delays, as goods being imported 
and exported fail to reach their destinations on time, or not at all.  
 
Case Study #3 – the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port 
 The Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) is located approximately 18 miles off 
the coast of Louisiana, in the Gulf of Mexico. Consisting of two platforms (the control 
platform and the pumping platform) which resemble offshore drilling rigs, the LOOP is 
responsible for loading and offloading “very large crude carriers” (VLCCs) and “ultra 
large crude carriers” (ULCCs), the largest petroleum-transporting ships in the world that 
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are too large for regular port facilities
168
. The LOOP also receives oil directly from two of 
the largest Gulf of Mexico oil fields
169
. Responsible for processing approximately 13% of 
imported foreign oil, the LOOP processes about 1.2 million barrels a day. Oil offloaded 
by the LOOP is transported by pipeline to storage and refinery sites on shore. 
 To offload, the VLCCs and ULCCs anchor at designated single-point mooring 
(SPM) bouys, whereupon hoses are hooked up and pumps begin offloading the anchored 
ship
170
. The LOOP is capable of offloading tankers at a rate of 100,000 barrels and hour; 
with most VLCCs and ULCCs capable of carrying approximately 2 million barrels, 
offloading is still a time-consuming process.  
 
Case Study #4 – the oil storage facilities in Cushing, Oklahoma 
 Cushing, Oklahoma is approximately an hour north of Oklahoma City, OK, a 
small town with the 2010 census showing a population of less than 8,000
171
. However, 
far from being a small Midwestern farming town, Cushing is also known as “The 
Pipeline Crossroads of the World”
172
. Home to the largest oil storage facility, and one of 
the largest petroleum refining operations, in the United States, Cushing holds roughly 
13% of the U.S.‟s oil reserves
173
. As of early 2016, due to depressed oil prices, Cushing‟s 
storage facilities were at approximately 89 percent full
174
, which represents billions of 
U.S. dollars in value. Cushing also serves as the delivery point for West Texas 
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Intermediate (WTI), a specific blend of light sweet crude found in the U.S., which is 
traded on the New York Stock exchange. To hold all this oil, numerous above-ground 
tank farms are found all around Cushing, predominantly to the north and south of the 
town, as seen on a satellite overlay of GoogleMaps (see image below, right side of image 
is North). Each tank can hold anywhere from 350,000 to 575,000 barrels of oil, and there 
are hundreds of tanks that make up the Cushing complex 
175
(Figure 4). 
 
(Source: GoogleMaps overhead of Cushing, OK. Rotated 90 degrees clockwise. Accessed 4 January 2017) 
 
 
 Analysis 
Turning Out the Lights – HV Transformers 
 HV transformers represent a unique vulnerability in the U.S. electric grid. As 
previously mentioned, there is little in the way of spare parts as each transformer is 
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unique, and replacement of transformers can take months, not to mention cost millions of 
dollars. Furthermore, there is consensus amongst experts that “a coordinated and 
simultaneous attack on multiple HV transformers could have severe implications for 
reliable electric service over a large geographic area, crippling its electricity network and 
causing widespread, extended blackouts”
176
. 
 There is also a precedent for this sort of attack in the United States. In the early 
morning hours of 16 April, 2013, after infiltrating and cutting fiber optic cables linking 
the power station‟s alarm and communications to the outside, two individuals fired over 
100 rounds into seventeen power transformers at a San Jose power substation, 
disappearing before police arrived – the entire attack taking less than twenty minutes
177
. 
Engineers were able to cover the loss of power through increased production at other 
stations, but it still took twenty-seven days before repairs were completed
178
. 
 There are three power grids in the United States – one in the western half of the 
country, one in the eastern half, and one in Texas
179
. All have struggled previously with 
even small problems, such as fallen tree branches, which result in “cascading blackouts”, 
one of which resulted in 50 million people in the eastern U.S. and Canada losing power 
back in 2003
180
. Within these three grids, HV/LPTs consist of less than 3% of all 
transformers, but carry 60-70% of the nation‟s electricity
181
. While the quick re-routing 
of electricity through other stations mitigated the potential effects of the San Jose 
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substation attack, the loss of more than one high voltage transformer could easily exceed 
the ability of the regional power grid to handle the increased load, results in blackouts 
and further damage to the grid
182
. Perhaps the biggest concern is that there is no federal 
body charged with protecting the nation‟s power grid and its components – that 
responsibility is largely left to individual utility owners
183
. Without federal oversight, 
protective measures have been uncoordinated and haphazard. 
 The Hoover and Glen Canyon Dams are both located in rural areas, far from 
major law enforcement agencies. Were a terrorist attack to occur, immediate response 
would be dependent on local law enforcement and security forces. When one examines 
how a coordinated, small-unit kinetic attack using swarm tactics, such as the 2008 attack 
in Mumbai or the Paris attack in November 2015 dwarfed the response capability of 
large-city law enforcement and dedicated counter-terrorism units, the capacity of a much 
smaller, more rural, and less-trained law enforcement agency does not appear promising.  
 The high voltage transformers at both dams are located out in the open, in full 
view from the canyon rims of both dams. Terrorists would not even need to gain direct 
access to the transformers – the San Jose attack illustrated how simple rifle fire caused 
significant damage. If the terrorists are able to acquire explosives, such as the suicide 
vests manufactured by the November 2015 Paris attackers, the possibility for catastrophic 
infrastructural damage widens even further. 
 
Fire on the Water – Ports of Houston and Corpus Christi, the LOOP 
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 While major U.S. port facilities are large enough that a small-unit terrorist attack 
would prove incapable of destroying the whole facility, the ships that pass through them 
are decidedly more fragile. Al-Qaeda has long targeted vital U.S. shipping interests – the 
suicide attack on the USS Cole, a Navy destroyer, in 2000; the attack on the MV Limburg 
by Al-Qaeda operatives in 2002 and the attempted suicide boat attack on a Japanese 
super-tanker in 2010 were all Al-Qaeda plots
184
. While the 2010 explosive-boat attack 
against the super-tanker failed to rupture the ship‟s hull, the explosive-boat attack against 
the MV Limburg as it transited the Gulf of Aden did result in casualties and the loss of 
approximately 90,000 barrels of crude oil into the Gulf
185
. In addition, the attack resulted 
in a short-term cessation of ship traffic through the Gulf of Aden, and Yemen lost 
approximately $3.8 million a month in port revenue
186
. The attack on the USS Cole 
nearly sank her, in addition to killing and wounding several dozen U.S. sailors. Al-Qaeda 
has long been a vocal proponent of suicide attacks on ships, calling on supporters to ram 
oil tankers with small boats laden with explosives
187
. 
 As mentioned earlier in the paper, the ports of Houston and Corpus Christi see 
heavy petroleum-industry transport, with both ports experiencing heavy tanker traffic. 
Ships waiting to be loaded or unloaded are required to anchor in the Gulf outside of both 
ports, which provides large, stationary targets for individuals seeking to carry out a Cole-
style attack. Ships unloading at the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP), the VLCC and 
ULCC-class petroleum tankers, are moored to buoys around the port platforms for the 
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unloading process, which can take over a day. Using small, fast, pleasure-style craft 
loaded with explosives, several attackers could targets multiple ships, or focus all their 
efforts on one. Furthermore, an attack on a ship entering or exiting the Houston shipping 
channel that resulted in the sinking of said cargo ship or tanker would block the channel, 
effectively shutting down the entire Port of Houston. In a similar vein, the Houston 
Shipping Channel shut down previously due to toppled power lines, as explored earlier in 
this paper – five bridges also span the Channel. A major attack against any of these 
would result in a closure of the Channel, and shut down one of the more important ports 
to U.S. shipping. 
 Even without VLCCs or ULCCs anchored and unloading, the LOOP itself is 
vulnerable to attack by explosive-laden small boats. More than fifteen terrorist attacks 
have occurred against offshore oil platforms (which the LOOP closely resembles) off the 
coast of Nigeria in the last ten years
188
. Located only eighteen miles off the Louisiana 
coast, the LOOP is with easy reach of small boats, and both it and the massive tankers 
which unload there are vulnerable to explosive-laden small boats. Concern about the 
vulnerability of oil rigs to terrorist attack has been expressed domestically
189
 and 
internationally
190
, but beyond a general consensus of the looming threat little has been 
done to address the vulnerability of these platforms. 
 Beyond the immediate damage of a terrorist attack against a petroleum tanker, 
port, or the LOOP, the knock-on effects could prove monumentally expensive and time-
consuming: the recent example of the Costa Concordia is a clear example of this. The 
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Houston Shipping channel is almost fifty feet deep and wide enough to accommodate 
shipping traffic – but a sunken or half-submerged ship would still completely obstruct 
traffic in and out of the port facilities. With busy port facilities shut down, massive 
economic impacts are inevitable from the interruption to import and export. Recovery 
operations to re-float and remove sunken ships are expensive. The clean-up costs for 
hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil leaked by a tanker ruptured in a terrorist attack are 
expensive, and the Gulf is still recovering from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill – two or 
three leaking supertankers could negate whatever recovery had been made thus far. A 
ruptured pipeline in Alabama in late 2016 resulted in shortages and price hikes 
downstream on the East Coast
191
 - the LOOP is responsible for offloading nearly 1/5 of 
all foreign imported oil. The loss of the LOOP would have an immediate and significant 
impact on the U.S. petroleum industry, which would have further knock-on effects 
financially and economically.  
 
Striking the Heartland – Cushing, Oklahoma 
 The oil storage facilities in and around Cushing, Oklahoma possess their own 
vulnerabilities. One of the single largest petroleum repositories in the United States, 
nearly all the oil and other petroleum products stored at Cushing are held in large, above-
ground tanks (as mentioned earlier in the case study section). These holding facilities also 
include refining and pumping facilities, as Cushing is known as “The Pipeline Crossroads 
of the World”
192
. With widely dispersed facilities and a police department numbering 
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only sixteen officers
193
, the majority of security provided to these storage facilities 
consists of chain-link fences and security personnel hired by the storage, pumping, and 
pipeline companies. 
 Cushing‟s location is not quite as remote as the Hoover or Glen Canyon Dams, 
but it still lies over an hour from a major metropolitan area (Oklahoma City) and 
significant law enforcement and counterterrorism support. A small group of terrorists, 
operating in a similar pattern to the Mumbai and Paris attackers, could cause significant 
damage before law enforcement was able to neutralize the threat. Terrorist attacks against 
similar storage/refinery resources have occurred in Algeria
194
, Iraq
195
, and Saudi 
Arabia
196
 - the attacks in Algeria and Iraq resulted in significant loss of life and damage 
to the facilities. The dispersed nature of the storage, refinery, and pumping facilities at 
Cushing make for a security nightmare – an expansive perimeter that local law 
enforcement cannot effectively enforce against a determined attacker. Particularly one 
they cannot detect until after the first shots are fired. 
 
Conclusion 
Concentration of Targets 
 Despite the lack of any attacks targeting the economic and energy infrastructure 
of the United States, there still exists a wide range of critical junctures that are vulnerable 
to a kinetic terrorist attack. The LPT/HV transformers located at Hoover and Glen 
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Canyon dams represent a key weakness in the U.S. electrical grid – relatively easy to 
damage and unsecured, the loss of these transformers would create an electrical crisis in 
the western United States, as replacements would take months to fabricate and ship, and 
the power grid lacks the capacity to insert work-arounds.  
The ports of Houston and Corpus Christi and the ships waiting to enter those ports 
remain vulnerable to explosive small-boat attacks similar to those carried out by Al-
Qaeda in the past – the successful sinking of a petroleum tanker or other ship in the 
Houston Shipping Channel would likely shut down all or part of the entire port complex 
for weeks or even months. As of 2014, the Port of Houston and the Houston Shipping 
Channel facilities supported approximately $629.4 billion of total U.S. economic 
activity
197
 - shutting down part of all of this facility by sinking a ship in the channel 
would result in massive economic losses in the U.S. and elsewhere, in addition to the 
environmental damage of leaking oil. The Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) sits just 
eighteen miles off the coast of Louisiana, within easy reach of small craft – it and the 
Very Large and Ultra Large Crude Carriers that it offloads are also vulnerable to 
explosive small-boat attacks.  
Cushing, Oklahoma, the main oil storage facility in the United States and possibly 
the key node in U.S. pipeline and pumping infrastructure, lies far from any significant 
law enforcement or counterterrorism help, and presents a perimeter that cannot be 
secured by local law enforcement. Swarm-style terrorist attacks have overwhelmed big-
city law enforcement and counterterrorism units in the recent past (Mumbai in 2008 and 
Paris in November 2015); a police force as small as Cushing‟s against a comparable 
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number of attackers to those in Mumbai or Paris would find themselves almost at a 1:1 
ratio of officer-to-terrorist.  
A small group of lightly armed terrorists, as witnessed in the Mumbai 2008 and 
Paris 2015 terror attacks, are capable of striking multiple targets simultaneously and 
overwhelming major law enforcement and counterterrorism agencies. The remote 
location of many of the critical infrastructure nodes examined in this chapter means that, 
should an attack occur, the necessary help would be far away in both distance and time. 
Both the Hoover and Glen Canyon dams are located far from urban centers and their 
large, experienced law enforcement agencies capable of conducting counterterrorism 
operations. While the ports of Houston and Corpus Christi are located in major 
metropolitan areas, the maritime nature of an attack might complicate responses by law 
enforcement. The LOOP is located nearly twenty miles off the coast of Louisiana, a 
nautical parallel to the remoteness of Hoover Dam. Cushing, Oklahoma is approximately 
one hour from Oklahoma City. Were terrorists to target any of these facilities with a 
swarm-style kinetic attack, the attackers could count on significant time delays before an 
effective counterterrorism response was mustered to confront them. 
 
Economic Damages – Fuel Shortages to Food Shortages 
Another key point to consider regarding terror attacks aimed at infrastructure and 
economic damage, is that it does not take a major loss of valuable commodities in order 
to trigger significant, if not catastrophic, knock-on effects. Eliminating the ability of the 
Hoover or Glen Canyon dams to produce electricity would leave millions of people 
without power – and thereby deprive them of refrigeration, air conditioning, water 
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pumping, and countless other key services. Were this loss of power to happen in the 
middle of summer, when much of the American Southwest is experiencing extreme heat, 
increased fatalities would result due to heat, food spoilage, and lack of water. Without the 
Glen Canyon electricity supply, because of its grid-surge function, the western power 
grid would not be able to bring back-up power plants online. 
A disruption in the domestic petroleum supply, even if by a few percentage 
points, would have adverse effects on transportation, power generation, and the larger 
economy. Higher gas prices would increase transportation costs, which would then 
increase the costs of the goods being transported. While it is impossible to estimate to 
what degree gas prices would raise in the aftermath of an attack on key U.S. petroleum 
infrastructure, prices will rise, with all the attendant knock-on effects that sharp increases 
in gas prices bring. Historically, there are few examples of civilian populations reacting 
positively to rapid hikes in gas prices and other goods.  
Even if the shortages were to prove relatively short-lived, the terrorists 
nonetheless would have accomplished a key goal, which was highlighted by Osama Bin 
Laden back in 2004. By striking a key economic or infrastructure node, the terrorists 
would force the United States to expend significant finances, effort, and attention in 
fixing internal infrastructure, economic, and environmental issues resulting from said 
attack. The financial impact, in turn, would result in reduced U.S. pressure on terrorist 
activities elsewhere, and provide terrorist organizations with breathing room to recoup, 
refit, and plan the next section of their campaign. 
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A Way Forward 
 While addressing viable counters to each case of infrastructure vulnerability to 
terrorism exceeds the mandate (and length restrictions) and goal of this chapter, there are 
two general proscriptions to offer as a means of catalyzing further specific actions.  
 
Hardening Assets 
The first counter to a terrorist attack on critical infrastructure is a hardening of 
current assets. Whether through physical construction, the addition of further security 
personnel, or a combination of the two, efforts must be made to coordinate the defense 
and hardening of the weaknesses in key infrastructural assets. Hardening, in turn, will 
provide the short-term protection necessarily to implement a greater level of resilience in 
the U.S. energy and environmental sectors, through dispersal. 
 
Asset Dispersal 
 Looking at the case studies examined in this paper, a key theme is that of 
concentration. While concentration may facilitate organization and be cheaper, it is also 
an example of “putting all the eggs in one basket”. Despite the significant cost and time 
required in dispersing key U.S. infrastructure and economic abilities and assets, this will 
ultimately result in the overall system being far more resilient to any sort of disruption. 
Smaller losses are easier to weather and recover from in a dispersed system. This will, 
however, require significant investment and cooperation between private companies and 
the federal and state governments, which has proven to be difficult in the past.  
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 However, without a widespread implementation of hardening and dispersal of key 
assets and abilities, there remain significant weaknesses in key nodes of the U.S. 
infrastructure and economic sectors. 
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Thesis Conclusion 
 
 The overall goal of this thesis is to highlight the vulnerability of U.S. energy and 
economic infrastructure to a kinetic terrorist attack. Each chapter of the thesis examines a 
different component of a possible attack arc: using hard-to-detect narco-submarines to 
infiltrate terrorists and equipment into the United States covertly; the swarm tactics which 
could be used by smuggled terrorists to effectively carry out an attack against a target; 
and key transportation and utility infrastructure and economic nodes that a terrorist group 
could target with a swarm-style attack in order to create significant, long-lasting 
economic and financial damage to the United States. By exploring the feasibility of each 
of these assets, ideally this paper will serve as a call to action that will narrow the avenue 
of a future Black Swan event. 
 One of the biggest critiques to the overall argument presented in this paper is 
simply “well, an attack against U.S. infrastructure by terrorists hasn‟t happened yet”. The 
author would respectfully remind critics that no one considered terrorists weaponizing 
hijacked airplanes before 9/11 – it was not until nearly three thousand Americans lay 
dead in New York City, Washington, DC and the Pennsylvania countryside that this 
“radical” threat received adequate credence. The sheer nature of Black Swan events 
means that their very concept is by definition outside the Pale and without precedent. As 
counter to this critique, I would highlight that each individual chapter of this paper 
provides multiple real-world examples of the chapter‟s concept – all that is lacking is for 
someone to link them all together in a real-world operation.  
 Another criticism, specific to the first chapter, is that there is no evidence that 
narco-submarines have been used to transport people and equipment as opposed to 
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narcotics. However, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence; just because 
something cannot be proven to be happening does not mean that it is not happening. The 
sheer magnitude of narco-submarine operations and capabilities, and the fact that they 
can transport cargo besides narcotics, represents a glaring hole in U.S. domestic security 
operations in and of itself. That the same drug trafficking organizations that operate these 
submarines have longstanding business relationships with Islamic terrorist organizations, 
and have cooperated with them in the past, should be enough to highlight the magnitude 
of this particular threat. 
 Despite the dire picture portrayed in these chapters, there are ways to address 
these threats. Narco-subs are a threat due to their ability to transport large amounts of 
cargo, their covert nature, and the fact that they represent a low-risk, high-success means 
of entering the United States. One way to counter this threat is to adopt a tactic 
implemented successfully against the Soviets during the Cold War: an underwater 
listening system to detect submarine traffic. The SOSUS system had resounding success 
against the Soviet submarine forces, and in a smaller body of water like the Gulf of 
Mexico, and key stretches of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, a similar system could prove 
to be a valuable asset in assisting the Coast Guard and Border Patrol in interdicting more 
submarines, to the point of making them coast-ineffective for the cartels to operate. 
Slowing and restricting narco-sub traffic would make narco-subs a less-appealing means 
of entering the U.S., and thus less attractive to Islamic terrorist organizations looking to 
insert men and equipment into the U.S. 
 Larger and more complicated options involve hardening existing weaknesses in 
the infrastructure nodes explored in this thesis, and creating a more resilient system 
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overall. Hardening infrastructure can take a number of forms – from additional security 
personnel, to physical barriers such as walls, fences, and gates – and can be implemented 
in a relatively budget-conscious manner. 
 Resiliency would be the harder, more expensive course of action, but ultimately 
the better one. Resiliency implies to making one particular asset or facility harder to 
attack and destroy, but in making the entire system more resistant to the shocks of an 
attack or a key node being taken offline. A specific example of this would be a strategic 
backstock of key Large Power Transformers, like those in place at Hoover and Glen 
Canyon Dam. While extremely expensive and physically large and thus difficult to store, 
having spares would allow for a much faster replacement process, compared to waiting 
until a transformer breaks or is destroyed to replace it. While the majority of Large Power 
Transformers are owned and operated by private companies, who are resistant to 
spending hundreds of millions of dollars on spare transformers that might not be needed, 
this is a situation where government support and involvement could help offset the costs 
of production, transportation and storage.  
 Further examples of resiliency would involve the dispersal of key assets to 
multiple facilities. While much of the shipping and petroleum industry has been 
consolidated into a few key facilities – such as the Ports of Houston and Corpus Christ, 
the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, and Cushing, Oklahoma – for ease of use and cost-
saving measures, this consolidation also means that the loss of one facility would have an 
inordinately large impact on the rest of the system. Creating multiple facilities, each 
handling a smaller portion of the workload but capable of handling a “surge” in 
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requirements would mean the loss of one facility would have a far smaller impact, 
resulting in less disruption and financial impact. 
 Addressing the risks illustrated in this thesis will not be easy or cheap. However, 
the consequences of a successful terrorist attack against a key infrastructure node would 
likely be far more expensive, and have a far greater negative impact on the public. Some 
of the solutions will require cooperation between numerous entities, to include federal 
and state governments and private corporations. However, a holistic and coordinated 
approach towards hardening existing infrastructure and creating resiliency within the 
system would go a long way towards reducing the negative impacts of a successful 
terrorist attack. An added benefit of several of the above counterterrorism suggestions is 
that, by hardening and dispersing key infrastructure assets, severe weather would have a 
lesser impact on key infrastructure – hurricanes in the Gulf have threatened port and 
refining facilities before, and earthquakes in Oklahoma are increasing in frequency and 
severity. Thus, the government and private corporations could kill two birds with one 
stone, while fortifying themselves against terrorism and Mother Nature. 
 One final note: efforts to harden assets will prevent another potential group from 
disrupting the economic life of the country – domestic terrorists. Many recent lone wolf 
attacks were “self-radicalized” individuals who never traveled overseas, and in some 
cases never had direct contact with Islamic terrorists. Domestic terrorists, in many ways, 
pose as great a threat as those attempting to infiltrate from abroad. Domestic terrorists 
have no need of narco-submarines and can go straight into swarm mode. Hardening 
current assets, and building resiliency into key systems, would deprive all attackers – 
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foreign, domestic, and natural – the ability to land a catastrophic strike against key U.S. 
infrastructure and economic nodes. 
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